Sedition in Nova Scotia: “R. v. Howe” and the “Contested Legality” of Seditious Libel by Cahill, Barry
SEDITION IN NOVA SCOTIA: R. v. HOWE AND 
THE “CONTESTED LEGALITY” OF SEDITIOUS 
LIBEL
Barry Cahill*
“Nova Scotia had found [in Joseph Howe] not only its John Wilkes but also its 
Charles James Fox.” —  fV.S. MacNutt, 1965
Introduction
New Brunswick was the first jurisdiction in what is now Canada to attempt to 
legislate on the subject o f criminal libel. In February 1797, at the climax o f a 
protracted constitutional struggle between the executive and legislative branches, 
New Brunswick’s House o f Assembly passed a bill enacting Fox’s Libel Act o f 1792, 
“a liberal but limited advance” affecting sedition law when “the reformers finally 
triumphed, briefly.”1 Though supported by the Loyalist Attorney-General, Jonathan 
Bliss (a future chief justice o f the province), the bill was rejected by the Council and 
did not become law. Though never in force in New Brunswick, Fox’s Libel Act was 
in force in Nova Scotia, where reception of the criminal laws o f England was not 
statutory but judicial, and those acts passed “in amelioration of the common law and 
[which] increased the liberty of the subject” were in force by analogy with the 
common law itself. Thus, Fox’s Libel Act, being declaratory o f the common law, 
was good law in Nova Scotia from the moment of its coming into force in England. 
Joseph Howe, defending himself on a charge of seditious libel in 1835, not only took 
for granted that Fox’s Libel Act was in force but also referred to it as the 
“Declaratory Act.”2 Fox’s Libel Act was good law because it ‘declared’ (clarified) 
received criminal procedure by removing “doubts respecting the functions of juries
* Independent scholar, Halifax NS. This article is dedicated to the memory o f F. Murray Greenwood.
1 F.M. Greenwood & B. Wright, “Introduction: State Trials, the Rule o f Law, and Executive Powers in 
Early Canada," in F. M. Greenwood & B. Wright, eds., Canadian State Trials, Volume I: Law, Politics 
and Security Measures, 1608-1837 (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 19%) at 29, 30. For the 
constitutional struggle, see D.G. Bell, “The Reception Question and the Constitutional Crisis o f the 
1790’s in New Brunswick” ( 1980) 29 U.N.B.L.J. 157.
2 J.A. Chisholm, rev. & ed., The Speeches and Public Letters of Joseph Howe (Halifax: The Chronicle 
Publishing Co. Ltd., 1909)66.
in cases o f libel.”3
Legal proceedings for the political offence o f sedition figured prominently in 
episodes o f dissent and political protest in Nova Scotia from the first stirrings of 
agitation for reform in 1819-20 to the events immediately preceding the 
commencement in 1836 o f the twelve-year struggle for responsible government. Yet 
while much has been written about the movement for political reform in the 
province, the role o f the courts as an arena o f struggle has received little critical 
attention. “As E.P. Thompson and others have shown in the English context,” states 
Barry Wright, “the historical record of the uses o f law (and the contestation o f these 
uses) casts considerable light on the nature o f authority and social conflict. It 
illuminates the relationship between discretionary power and the rule o f law, the 
repressive and ideological roles o f law, as well as law’s social meanings.”4 Though 
similar research on early Atlantic Canada remains in its infancy,5 the publication of 
the first volume in The Osgoode Society’s series, Canadian State Trials, points the 
way ahead.6 Two Nova Scotian sedition cases —  Wilkie (1820) and Howe (1835)
— suggest that the administration o f criminal justice was relatively non-repressive 
by comparison with contemporary British, not to mention Upper Canadian standards 
of constitutional liberty. Moreover, legal principles and procedures that seem too 
technical from a post -Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms perspective on 
criminal justice history or historical criminology, were uniquely significant for both 
the perpetrators and the victims o f these prosecutions. For the oligarchy, the cases 
reflect the importance o f law in the executive-cum-judicial regulation of political 
discourse. For those subject to the proceedings, Wright’s “contested legality” 
formed a major part o f the pre-Responsible Government battlefield, gradually 
turning political controversies into movements o f political protest.
3 32 Geo. 3, c. 60 (GB).
4 B. Wright, “Sedition in Upper Canada: Contested Legality” (1992) 29 Labour/Le Travail 7.
5 Basic misunderstandings persist; see, for example, P. A. Buckner & J.G. Reid, eds., The Atlantic 
Region to Confederation: A History (Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 1994) at 259 & 302, where 
William Wilkie (1820) is “tried and convicted on a charge o f  seditious libel,” while Joseph Howe 
(acquitted in 1835) is “charged with libel.” The important point is missed that the crime was the same 
in both instances. Even W.S. MacNutt, whose account o f  the Howe case is longer and better informed, 
misunderstands the nature o f the proceeding (“libel suit”): W.S. MacNutt, The Atlantic Provinces: The 
Emergence o f  Colonial Society, 1712-1857 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1968 [repr. o f 1965 ed.]) 
at 200.
6 Greenwood & Wright, supra note 1. Seven o f the seventeen chapters relate to Atlantic Canadian topics, 
appropriate recognition o f  the fact not only that Nova Scotia is Canada’s oldest common-law jurisdiction 
but also that it served as the model for the legal system o f  Québec, 1764-1974, before the Quebec Act.
This article examines how sedition law was used to deal with political dissent 
in Nova Scotia and how these uses were contested. Though politics and conflict 
over privilege and abuse o f power were not unknown to the civil courts, the principal 
legal engagements o f the proto-reformers involved prosecutions for sedition. There 
had been prosecutions for treason and sedition during the American Revolution,7 but 
it was not until after the end o f the Napoleonic wars that officialdom, faced with the 
stirrings of extra-legislative political opposition, seized on the repressive 
mechanisms of the criminal law in an effort to quash political dissent. Nevertheless, 
sedition proceedings were infrequent. The sheer paucity o f cases in Nova Scotia, 
unlike Upper Canada, suggests that they were indeed isolated and extreme 
exceptions. Their infrequency is indicated in the archival court records for Nova 
Scotia, which reveal two prosecutions between 1820 and 1835. This excluded the 
possibility o f summary deportation proceedings, such as those taken under the 
authority o f Upper Canada’s Seditious Aliens Act (1804-1829), a counterpart of 
which Nova Scotia did not have. There was, however, one parliamentary privilege 
proceeding o f questionable constitutionality taken against a member o f the House 
of Assembly in 1829-30 for slandering a fellow member.8 The consequent “Barry 
riots” owed something to the mercantile-official élite’s virtual monopoly o f political 
power, which aggravated class tensions and fuelled the political conflict. In any 
event, taking into account the province’s tiny population, much smaller than Upper 
Canada’s, the very rareness o f sedition proceedings in Nova Scotia highlights their 
impact and historical significance.
Important differences may be discerned between the Wilkie and Howe 
prosecutions for seditious libel, one striking example being the sentence imposed on 
conviction in the earlier case. In 1820, criticism of the ruling class, ranging from the 
Council o f Twelve who governed the province to the magistrates who governed the 
town and district o f Halifax, led to the successful prosecution o f William Wilkie for
7 See J. Phillips & E.A. Clarke, “Rebellion and Repression in Nova Scotia in the Era o f  the American 
Revolution” in Greenwood & Write, supra note 1 at 172; D.G. Bell, “Sedition among the Loyalists: The 
Case o f  Saint John,1784-6” in Greenwood & Wright, supra note 1 at 223; B. Cahill, “The Sedition 
Trial o f  Timothy Houghton: Repression in a Marginal New England Planter Township during the 
Revolutionary Years” (1994) 24:1 Acadiensis35;and B. Cahill, “The Treason o f  the Merchants: Dissent 
and Repression in Halifax in the Era o f  the American Revolution” in P. A. Buckner, G.G. Campbell &
D. Frank, eds., The Acadiensis Reader: Volume One, 3rd ed. (Fredericton, N.B: Acadiensis Press, 1998) 
at 146.
8 John Alexander Barry ([ca. 1790]-l 872) was expelled from the House o f  Assembly and ordered 
imprisoned by the speaker.
publishing a seditious libel.9 The heavy sentence— two years’ hard labour— meted 
out to the radical pamphleteer Wilkie occurred in the context o f official concern 
about political dissent, and in particular about published criticism o f the status quo, 
seen as an indicator o f the potential popular appeal o f radicals in particular and 
reformers in general. Official perceptions and objectives were clearly articulated in 
the policy o f using sedition proceedings to silence and marginalize political 
dissenters —  implicitly constructing criticism as disloyalty. By these measures, the 
first stirrings o f reform were quieted and the beginning o f the reform movement 
deferred for nearly a decade. Then, in 1835, a thirty-year-old newspaper proprietor 
and editor, Joseph Howe ( 1804-1873), was subjected to a sensationally unsuccessful 
seditious libel prosecution and was soon launched on a political career which 
culminated in his appointment as lieutenant-governor o f Nova Scotia a few weeks 
before his death. As a result o f Howe’s acquittal, the government was extremely 
reluctant ever again to resort to the courts to deal with its political opponents. There 
would not be another seditious libel prosecution in Nova Scotia for nearly a century.
This study centres on Howe, which J.M. Bumsted rightly describes as “probably 
the most famous single court case on the subject [of seditious libel] in Canadian 
history.”10 It is more outstanding and influential than Wilkie, though both involved 
the ‘tried and true’ common-law offence o f seditious libel. The range o f repressive 
legal measures available was, for all practical purposes, limited to sedition, which 
reflected both the opportunities and threats posed by the printing-press as the catalyst 
for written mass-communication of political ideas and the promotion of political 
dissent. In Nova Scotia, unlike Upper Canada and Great Britain, there was no local 
sedition legislation to supplement the common-law offence. Furthermore, the 
government did not respond to Howe’s acquittal by adopting punitive English 
legislation, such as the 1819 Act fo r  the more effectual Prevention and Punishment 
o f blasphemous and seditious Libels.11 Instead, the government responded by 
forswearing any further trials for sedition. The Howe case also highlights the
9 See G.V.V. Nicholls, “A Forerunner o f Joseph Howe” (1927) 8 Canadian Historical Review 224; B. 
Cahill, “Sedition in Nova Scotia: R. v. Wilkie (1820) and the Incontestable Illegality o f  Seditious Libel 
before R. v. Howe (1835)” (1994) 44 Dalhousie L. J. 458. For the relationship between Wilkie and Howe 
as exercises in the official repression o f  political dissent, see J.S. Martell, Origins o f  Self-Government 
in Nova Scotia, 1815-1836  (Ph.D. thesis, University o f  London, 1935) at 375-76.
10 J.M. Bumsted, “Liberty o f  the Press in Early Prince Edward Island, 1823-9” in Greenwood & Wright, 
supra note 1 at 522.
11 (1819) 60 Geo. 3, c. 8 (U.K.) —  one o f  the so-called “Six Acts,” a series o f  repressive measures 
enacted in the wake o f  the Peterloo Massacre; see generally J.R. Spencer, “Criminal Libel —  A Skeleton 
in the Cupboard” (1977) Crim. L. R. 383 at 465.
arbitrary nature of the administration of sedition law, a side-effect o f the executive 
dominance of colonial government, which lacked even the appearance of 
institutional separation o f crown and judiciary. Sedition proceedings, and tension 
between the rule of law (“British justice”) and executive control o f its 
administration, furnished a rich panoply of constitutional and legal arguments which 
Joseph Howe deployed to contest legal repression.
After first exploring the political and legal background to the Howe prosecution, 
this article examines in detail its inauguration, progress, resolution, consequences 
and meaning. As with Wilkie, the Howe case illustrates the repressive use of the 
criminal law as well as the promise and potential “o f counter-hegemonic struggles 
in the criminal courts.”12 Both cases underline the importance o f sedition law as a 
mechanism for repressing political dissent, and one to which resort had not been 
made in Nova Scotia since the American Revolution. The government’s having 
recourse to prosecution for a scandalous common-law offence was intended to 
buttress the authority o f the magistrateship by criminalizing published criticism. It 
was an exercise in brinkmanship fraught with both risks and limitations, deriving 
from basic principles o f criminal justice. The ideological consensus underpinning 
the rule o f law depended on the perception that it could withstand political 
manipulation. From the perspective o f the accused, the presumed blindness of 
justice offered the possibility o f contesting the repressive uses o f law. This 
contestability, however, provided meagre resources for resisting, much less 
overcoming repression. Victims o f politically-inspired prosecutions were limited to 
self-defensive, and sometimes self-defeating struggles, within a process which 
hardly constituted equality before and under the law. The tables were turned with 
the acquittal o f Howe, the results o f which not only embarrassed at least some o f the 
complainant magistrates into resigning, but also decisively raised petit-bourgeois 
political consciousness; helped relaunch reform as a movement o f political protest 
and the Reformers as a political party; and brought them to power in a dozen years.
Investigating the importance o f law to accused and prosecutors alike emphasizes 
that legal ‘histories o f resistance’ must reduce myth-encrusted heroes such as Joseph 
Howe to a human scale. There are historiographical difficulties inherent in 
extrapolating a general theory from any case study, however celebrated the case and 
detailed the study. Moreover, ideologically-weighted concepts such as “élite” and 
“popular dissent” must take into account the general absence o f class consciousness 
among the petite bourgeoisie of urban Halifax —  to which both Wilkie and Howe
belonged —  even during the 1830s. Sedition prosecutions were intended not only 
to discredit opposition spokesmen and muzzle the press, but also to punish 
extra-legislative political criticism by stigmatizing it as unjustified and unreasonable. 
A sustained and systematic examination o f the leading case reveals not only that 
sedition law was an instrument o f repression, but also that its Achilles heel in the 
form o f legal contestability could be successfully exploited.
The Political Background
Nova Scotian politics in the period 1830 to 1835 were in a state of ferment and 
flux.13 The Tory-Loyalist Ascendancy, which had endured for forty years, crashed 
and burned in the Brandy Election of 1830 —  partly as a result o f the Barry riots — 
but no new consensus emerged to replace, much less revive the ancien régime. The 
progression o f Joseph Howe, the dutiful son of a ‘Boston Tory’ of 1776, from 
conservative to reformer climaxed in his 1835 trial for seditious libel, which D.C. 
Harvey viewed as the culmination of Nova Scotia’s twenty-year-long intellectual 
“Great Awakening.” 14
In a seminal article published in 1974, Kenneth McNaught described Howe as 
one of Canada’s “two most significant cases involving political freedom of the 
press” —  the other being Dixon for seditious libel arising from the Winnipeg 
General Strike o f 1919.15 McNaught failed to mention an important early New 
Brunswick case (Hooper, 1830), where the proprietor-editor of the British Colonist 
(Saint John) was prosecuted for seditious libel after publishing, under the author’s 
suggestive Puritan nom-de-plume (“Hampden”), a letter castigating the legal 
profession and the administration of justice. Hooper, like Howe and Fred Dixon 
after him, defended himself — but was discharged rather than acquitted, due to a 
hung jury and the trial judge’s advice to the attorney-general to stay the
13 See B. Cuthbertson, Johnny Bluenose at the Polls: Epic Nova Scotian Election Battles. 1758-1848 
(Halifax: Formac. 1994) at 60-92, 288-310.
14 D.C. Harvey, “The Intellectual Awakening o f  Nova Scotia” in G.A. Rawlyk, ed.. Historical Essays 
on the Atlantic Provinces (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967) 99; D.C. Harvey, ed.. The Heart o f  
Howe: Selections from the Letters and Speeches o f  Joseph Howe (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 
1939)89-91.
b See K. McNaught, “Political Trials and the Canadian Political Tradition” (1974) 24 U.T.L.J. 164-166; 
and B. Cahill, “Howe ( 1835), Dixon ( 1920) and McLachlan ( 1923): Comparative Perspectives on the 
Legal History o f  Sedition” ( 1996) 45 U.N.B.L.J. 281. McNaught distinguishes between criminal (i.e., 
defamatory) libel and seditious libel, and wrongly places Howe in the former category.
proceedings.16 Whether Hooper’s discharge or Howe’s acquittal established, 
preserved or strengthened the freedom o f the press is a moot point which, regardless 
o f how it is decided, does not provide the key to understanding either the legal or 
historical context o f Howe’s trial for sedition. Yet traditional scholarship fails to 
offer a properly contextual ized legal or political analysis o f Howe, which was by any 
definition a state trial.17
Another question which requires attention is whether the prosecution o f Joseph 
Howe for sedition would have taken place at all had Howe's newspaper not been the 
voice of radical political opposition to Halifax's corrupt, inefficient and unreformed 
government. This self-perpetuating gerontocracy of justices of the peace, based on 
the old English model, had ruled Halifax since its founding in 1749. It had been 
resisting any and all attempts at civic incorporation since 1785, when Saint John, 
Canada’s first city, was incorporated. Published criticism of the magistrateship 
tended to be construed as criticism of the executive branch — the 
lieutenant-governor and council — who “were equally supreme in the control of 
town affairs as those of the province at large.”18
The movement for local government reform was inaugurated by the 1834 grand
lh Concerning Hooper, which was New Brunswick’s last known seditious libel case, see W.S. MacNutt, 
"Hooper, John” 9 Dictionary o f Canadian Biography 399; W.S. MacNutt, New Brunswick: A History, 
1784-1867 (Toronto: Macmillan o f Canada, 1984) at 223. Hooper was one o f the fifteen seditious libel 
prosecutions identified by Bell in New Brunswick’s history: D.G. Bell, “Sedition among the Loyalists: 
The Case o f  Saint John, 1784-1786” in Greenwood & Wright, supra note 1 at 240 n. 38. How little resort 
was made to seditious libel prosecutions in Nova Scotia after 1835 is a good deal less striking than the 
situation in New Brunswick after 1786. The reason, o f course, was Joseph Howe’s acquittal.
17 The original records o f  the trial had already disappeared or were not consulted for William Annand’s 
editio princeps o f 1858. A stenographic report formed the basis o f Trial for L ibel/on  the / Magistrates 
o f  Halifax. /  The King vs. Joseph Howe, /  Before the /  Chief Justice and a Special Jury/Suprem e Court
- Hilary Term (Halifax: [Joseph Howe], 1835), 102 p. (Canadian Institute for Historical 
Microreproductions [CIHM], no. 62316). This was reprinted in W. Annand, ed„ Speeches and Public 
Letters o f  the Hon. Joseph Howe (Boston: J.P. Jewett, 1858) at 1:14; and Chisholm, supra note 2 at 22 
(all quotations taken from the latter). Studies include J.A. Chisholm, “The King v. Joseph Howe: 
Prosecution for Libel” ( 1935) 13 Can. Bar Rev. 584 (unhistorical); J.M. Beck, “'A Fool for a Client': 
The Trial o f Joseph Howe” (1974) 3:2 Acadiensis 27 [hereinafter “A Fool for a Client”] (political 
histoiy); repr. J. M. Beck, Joseph Howe. Volume 1: Conservative Reformer. 1804-1848 (Kingston and 
Montreal, 1982) 129-46 [hereinafter Joseph Howe]; P.A. Buckner & D. Frank, eds., Atlantic Canada 
Before Confederation. The Acadiensis Reader: Volume One, 2nd ed. (Fredericton, N.B: Acadiensis 
Press, 1990) 243-260; and B. Cahill, “A Forerunner o f J.B. McLachlan? —  Sedition, Libel and 
Manipulating the Myth o f Howe" ( 1996) 44 Collections o f the Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society 
189.
18 T.B. Akins, “History o f Halifax City” ( 1895) 8 Collections o f the Nova Scotia Historical Society 88.
jury, in tandem with Howe as editor of the Novascotian, and sponsored in the House 
o f Assembly by Charles Rufus Fairbanks (master o f the rolls in Chancery), the only 
proto-reformer among the Tory judiciary,19 with the cooperation of his 
father-in-law, William Lawson, who was the only independent liberal among the 
solidly Tory merchantocracy. “[I]rregularities [in the administration ofjustice in the 
Commissioners' Court].” Joseph Howe was to assert in his defence,20 “formed a part 
of the general system, which justified the charges of grand juries, the surprise o f the 
executive, the investigations of the Council, and the publication of the alleged 
libel.”21 A second letter from “The People,” published in the Novascotian o f 1 
January 1835 (see Appendix), was a mere pretext on which to ground the 
prosecution o f Howe for publishing a seditious libel. Otherwise, the magistrates 
would have solicited the prosecution two months earlier, in November 1834, when 
the first letter from “The People” was published. Then, however, the 
attorney-general would have had to deal with a reformist grand jury working 
hand-in-glove with Howe to expose sessional misgovemment. The wider context 
within which both letters from “The People” appeared reflected continuing 
complaints by the Halifax grand jury of 183422 against abuse of office, dereliction 
of duty and public corruption. Howe’s war o f words against the magistrates in the 
columns of the Novascotian was helped considerably by the official grand jury 
documents which he had obtained and published in collusion with the foreman. 
These papers included not only the grand jury's address to the lieutenant-governor
lv It was Fairbanks who, despite considerable opposition from the vested interests, brought in the 
abortive Town o f  Halifax Incorporation Bill in February 1835. The member for Halifax township, 
Fairbanks was soon afterwards forced to vacate his Assembly seat by an unlikely combination o f Tories 
and radical whigs, led by Thomas Forrester, who very properly considered the presence o f senior judges 
in the Assembly to be unconstitutional.
211 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 58. The Commissioners' Court was "a court for the summary trial o f  
actions” —  a small claims court —  unique to Halifax township. It had been established by act o f the 
Legislature in 1817, about two years after the Police Court. The establishment o f these tribunals, both 
staffed by lay magistrates, resulted from government's attempt to reform and regularize the 
administration ofjustice in Halifax; see P. Girard, “The Rise and Fall o f Urban Justice in Halifax" ( 1988) 
8:2 Nova Scotia Historical Review 8(2) at 60.
21 The best account o f the second reform movement. 1829 to 1834 — the revolt o f the shopkeepers 
(Howe's "middling” class[es], alias the petite bourgeoisie) —  which culminated in the Howe prosecution 
early in 1835 —  is to be found in D.A. Sutherland, “The Merchants o f Halifax, 1815-1850: A 
Commercial Class in Pursuit o f Metropolitan Status” (Ph.D. thesis. University o f Toronto, 1975), 
244-252.
22 The grand jury was the local government watchdog, having more or less arrogated to itself especial 
responsibility for auditing the accounts o f the district officers.
but also its various presentments.23 Moreover, “by mid-January [1835] the 
Committee o f the Council had confirmed many o f the charges o f the [former] grand 
jury.”24
The end o f term of the 'activist' grand jury in December 1834 raised the 
possibility that Howe would be the sacrificial lamb if and when the reaction 
occurred. He would answer for the lèse-majesté o f the old grand jury, while the 
government bided its time, taking “six weeks to determine upon this prosecution”25
—  six weeks in which to determine whether the new grand jury was politically sound 
and compliant. This undermines David Sutherland's contention that “Joseph Howe, 
in his defence speech, argued that certain members of the magisterial board [Court 
o f Sessions] and Grand Jury had supported the prosecution in the expectation that 
a libel trial would force reform of the municipal government.”26 Granted, a simple 
majority o f the twenty-three members of the grand jury had to approve the 
indictment for the trial to proceed, but Sutherland goes too far in suggesting that the 
promoters and managers of the prosecution intended it to be a test case in the impact 
o f political protest. The evidence suggests instead that the prosecution of Howe was 
a desperate, rearguard action to quash the nascent local government reform 
movement.
Though the magistrates had not been criticized in their judicial capacity, and the 
editor o f the newspaper in which “The People” was published had not had any 
dealings with the Court o f Sessions which might have given rise to the alleged libel, 
it was Howe who was the focus of hostile interest. By the end o f 1834 their 
worships had had enough. Though they were losing the war o f words in the press, 
it must have required a degree of brazenness to denounce as a libel a letter in which
23 Howe went so far as to state during his defence that the old grand jury's final presentment “at the close 
o f the December term is a grosser libel than this letter [the second from 'The People']”: Chisholm, supra 
note 2 at 60. The presentment had been published in the Novascotian on 11 Dec 1834.
24 Beck, “Fool for a Client,” supra note 17 at 33. Howe was to quote the committee's report in the course 
o f  his defence; it remains unclear how he obtained a copy.
25 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 33. The six-week period would have been ca. 1 Jan-10 Feb 1835 —  from 
the publication o f  the second letter signed “The People,” to the delayed commencement o f  Hilary Term 
in the Supreme Court. It may not have occurred to Howe that the magistrates dared not move against 
him until they had taken the measure o f the new grand jury.
26 Sutherland, supra note 21 at 263 n. 74; the reference is to Chisholm, supra note 2 at 52 (“Some o f  
them [magistrates] have urged on this prosecution, not from unkindness to me, but in order that others, 
whom they know to be criminal ... .might be exposed”). Cf. Beck's intriguing speculation, which 
attributes this motive to Howe himself: “Fool for a Client,” supra note 17 at 31 n. 22.
Sir Colin Campbell, the recently-appointed lieutenant-governor o f the province, was 
obsequiously praised, not as chief executive but as “Chief Magistrate'^italics 
added].27 The grand juries o f the years 1832 through 1834 were of “radical whig” 
tendency;28 thus, the magistrates chose the interregnum between the retirement of 
the old year's grand jury and the summoning o f the new to make their pitch for a 
prosecution. They would have known that a prosecution for seditious libel 
precluded any inquiry into the truth o f the statements: “the greater the truth the 
greater the libel,” ran the old saw.29 Cut to the quick by the former grand jury's 
publication o f presentments and other classified documents critical o f the Court o f 
Sessions, the magistrates seem to have viewed the prosecution as a tactical 
imperative, a means of restoring lost face.
The Howe prosecution was the cumulative effect and culmination o f the second 
reform movement. The official document precipitating the magistrates' complaint 
was the final presentment o f the outgoing grand jury in December 1834, which 
Howe described as a “grosser libel” than the second letter from “The People,” and 
which he published on 1 January 1835. Howe, perhaps deliberately, was courting 
danger; he disregarded his own safety and risked a public prosecution. It is very 
doubtful whether the second letter from “The People” would have been made the 
ground o f a seditious libel prosecution had it not been published by Joseph Howe in 
the Novascotian. Having lost the initiative and then counter-attacked after it was too 
late to retrieve the situation, the magistrates sought to settle scores with the one who 
was not only the most visible but also the most vulnerable o f their enemies, and 
whose conviction would yield the highest return in political vengeance. The Court 
o f Session had only nominal authority over the grand juiy, whose presentments they 
routinely ignored, and they could not prosecute or sue them for a libellous 
presentment. Howe's newspaper was the voice o f a reformist grand jury, so it was 
Howe on whose head the hammer ofjustice descended. The second letter from “The 
People” triggered a proceeding which seems to have been already determined upon
27 Campbell, a political neophyte, cooperated with the old year's grand jury by expeditiously referring 
their complaints about the Court o f  Sessions first to the Council and then to the Assembly: Journal o f  
the House o f  Assembly [JHA], 2 Feb 1835, and passim . On Campbell's administration ( 1834-1840) see 
S.W. Spavold, “Nova Scotia under the Administration o f  Sir Colin Campbell” (MA thesis, Dalhousie 
University, 1953); P.A. Buckner, “Campbell, Sir Colin” 7 Dictionary o f  Canadian Biography 142.
28 Beck makes the astute observation that “the grand juries o f  the 1830's ... provided the political 
education for the leading Reformers o f  Halifax, Howe included”: “Fool for a Client,” supra note 17 at 
29.
29 As Howe was later to observe in his defence, “The truth would be no defence in a criminal action, as 
the magistrates very well know or they would not have brought it”: Chisholm, supra note 2 at 36.
by the magistrates in the well-founded hope that the inexperienced 
lieutenant-governor, in his misplaced desire to please everyone, would grant their 
request for a public, political libel prosecution.
The Legal Background
At a special meeting of the Sessions held on 8 January 1835, the custos rotulorum 
(chief magistrate) o f the District o f Halifax, James Foreman,30 advised his fellow 
justices of the quorum31 that they had been asked — by whom is not recorded —  to 
take into consideration a letter signed “The People,” published in Joseph Howe's 
Novascotian on New Year's Day,32 which reflected on the magistrates.33 Rather than 
consult with the attorney-general, as the chief justice was later to suggest they should 
have done, the magistrates took their complaint directly to the lieutenant-governor. 
Sir Colin Campbell, whom the subscribing magistrates asked “to direct the Crown 
officers to take immediately the necessary steps for prosecuting the party who has 
made them [the charges],”34 referred the complaint to Attorney-General Archibald.
30 The septuagenarian Foreman, a prominent and influential merchant, had been custos o f  the district o f  
Halifax since 1828; see D.A. Sutherland, “Foreman, James” 8 Dictionary o f Canadian Biography 299- 
300. Lending both his signature and his prestige to the magisterial complaint was to be among 
Foreman’s final acts as custos; before the end o f January he had resigned, pleading old age: Minutes o f  
Council, 26 Jan. 1835:NSARM RG l.v o l. 196 at 115.
31 For example, twelve o f  those justices o f the peace (out o f  a total o f  thirty-two), who acted judicially 
at the Quarter Sessions; in other words, a quorum over whom the custos presided. (At least three o f  the 
current active magistrates did not sign the complaint.)
32 The bearer o f the nom de plume was George Thompson (1800-1856), an old friend o f  Howe's: G.E. 
Fenety, Life and Times o f  the Hon. Joseph Howe: The Great Nova Scotian and ex-Lieut. Governor (Saint 
John, N.B: Progress Office, 1896) at 104. This was the second letter from “The People.” The first, 
which contained a transparent reference to the Wilkie case (“The odium that has hitherto attached to the 
character o f  professed reformers...”) and in which Thompson predicted the introduction o f  “rational and 
radical reform,” had been published in the Novascotian o f 19 Nov 1834, before the grand jury's 
campaign against the magistrates began in earnest. Howe had the second letter in type for 10 December, 
but was sufficiently concerned about its incendiary nature to defer printing it until those grand jury 
documents o f  a similar tenor had appeared.
33 'Sessions / 1834': NSARM RG 34-312 series P vol. 11, [n.p],
34 Foreman et al. to Campbell, 8 Jan. 1835: NSARM MG 20, vol. 700, f. 49 (Royal Nova Scotia 
Historical Society fonds). The signatories, apart from the custos himself, were John Albro, Samuel Head 
MD, John Howe Jr., John Liddell, William Henry Roach, George Norton Russell, James Noble Shannon, 
John Leander Starr, Joseph Starr, James Heaton Tidmarsh and Richard Stout Tremain. ( Italics denote 
those magistrates who were to resign in consequence o f  the verdict in Howe.) All but two o f  them —  
Head and Howe -  were merchants; J.L. Starr (nephew o f  Joseph) was also a member o f  the grand jury 
for 1835.
The attorney-general, annoyed perhaps at being somersaulted by the complainants, 
pointedly asked “whether the Magistrates wish the Publisher or Author of the 
Publication in the Nova Scotian o f the 1st Instant signed 'The People' to be 
prosecuted.” Unsurprisingly, he did not get an answer. The magistrates forbore 
advising the attorney-general whom to prosecute “for a libel,” as that fell entirely 
within his discretion.35 Nevertheless, the “party complained o f ’ was the writer o f the 
letter, not the editor o f the newspaper who had published it. Archibald responded 
by feigning complete ignorance of the magistrates' request, which had been placed 
in his hands after being minuted. Though he was to admit during the trial that the 
name o f the author had never been demanded, Archibald also maintained that “had 
the author been given up,” he “would not have proceeded against the publisher.”36
The magistrates who laid the complaint assumed the high prerogative view of 
libel —  that the defamation of any Crown servant was seditious. The question of 
whom to prosecute was left to the attorney-general, the magistrates having succeeded 
in their primary aim of soliciting a prosecution directly from the lieutenant-governor. 
As there were no lawyers among the justices o f the session, there was no mention of 
libel, let alone sedition, and consequently no recognition of the fact that publication, 
authorship or the procuring o f either might ground the charge. Nor perhaps were the 
magistrates aware that libels “having a direct and immediate tendency to a breach 
o f the peace [i.e., seditious libel], are indictable in the [Quarter] Sessions.”37 The 
magistrates retained legal counsel only after the government had ordered the 
prosecution of Howe —  there was no point doing so beforehand. 
Lieutenant-Governor Campbell might well have consulted with Attorney-General 
Archibald, who might well have advised against a prosecution. As matters stood, 
however, the attorney-general was not consulted and it was left to him to decide 
whom to prosecute not whether to prosecute.
While Howe, as editor o f the Novascotian, was criminally responsible for any 
libel published in his newspaper, there was no legal reason why he alone should have 
been prosecuted, had the overarching political purpose not been to kill the 
messenger. The precedent established by Wilkie, where the author rather than the
35 'Sessions / 1834' (under date 24 Jan 1835).
36 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 77.
37 J.G. Marshall, The Justice o f  the Peace, and County & Township Officer, in the Province o f  Nova 
Scotia: being a guide to such justice and officers in the discharge o f  their official duties (Halifax: 
Gossip and Coade, 1837) at 296. Judge Marshall, whose JP's manual was based on Richard Bum's 
classic, makes no reference to the recently adjudged Howe.
publisher was prosecuted for a seditious libel, was not followed. In both cases, the 
victim of the prosecution was pre-selected; whether he was author or publisher was 
immaterial, as both lay under the blanket o f the common-law offence of 
sedition-libel. Though the publisher “had full permission to give up the author 
[George Thompson] whenever he pleased... the name had never been demanded.”38 
It therefore seems probable that the decision to prosecute Howe, and Howe alone, 
was dictated by political considerations and was taken at the highest level. The 
governing Council seized the opportunity to rid themselves of a meddlesome editor, 
just as they had disposed of the gadfly William Wilkie fifteen years earlier.
The important decision which then had to be made by the crown was how to 
institute proceedings. The usual procedure in England for initiating a prosecution 
for political libel was not by indictment. “The Attorney-General himself usually 
prosecuted,” writes Spencer. “The prosecution was nearly always begun on the 
Attomey-General's ex officio information —  a procedure which short-circuited the 
preliminary stages through which prosecutions ordinarily had to go, and so obviated 
the risk of an independently-minded [grand] jury refusing to find a true bill against 
the suspect.”39 But the only ex officio criminal information known to Nova Scotia's 
justice system was that authorized by imperial statute for a breach o f the revenue 
laws.40 An ex officio information had not been filed in Wilkie, which Archibald as 
king’s counsel had prosecuted and which certainly met Beamish Murdoch's criteria 
for use “in cases o f sedition, riots o f a public nature, and libels against the executive 
government;”41 in Howe, the alleged libel was against the county government. The 
reason why the attorney-general did not lay an ex officio criminal information was 
that he did not wish to assume direct personal responsibility for inaugurating the
38 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 77; the attorney-general did not deny this assertion by the accused, but 
suggested that the name should have been volunteered: “[H]ad the author been given up, 1 would not 
have proceeded against the publisher.” Clearly Archibald had in mind Wilkie, where it was the author 
not the publisher who was proceeded against.
39 Spencer, supra note 11 at 384.
40 Murdoch, Epitome o f  the Laws o f  Nova Scotia (Halifax, N.S: Joseph Howe, 1833) at 4:181 -2.
41 On the other hand, both Attorney-General Archibald in his reply to the defence and Chief Justice 
Halliburton in his charge to the jury took the view that ex officio criminal informations were legal and 
might be expedient. “Such an opinion savors strongly o f  the high prerogative lawyer,” Murdoch wrote, 
“and is hardly in keeping with the genius o f English liberty and law”: supra note 40 at 181. On no 
subject did Murdoch express himself more strongly than the unconstitutionality o f  ex officio criminal 
informations. In Nova Scotia, this prosecutorial instrument was treated as if  it were a prerogative writ; 
it was rarely applied for and even more rarely issued —  out o f  the Court o f  Chancery. In Upper Canada, 
on the other hand, the ex officio criminal information “was widely resorted to”: Wright, supra note 4 at
prosecution. “I could have proceeded by that mode [ex officio information],” 
Archibald was to declaim during his reply to the defence, “but I have never been 
inclined to ride upon the prerogative o f the Crown, and I therefore laid the matter 
before the grand inquest [jury] of the county. ... One gentleman [who?] named the 
other course to me, but I said No; I will proceed by a fairer mode of indictment.”42 
Archibald chose to proceed by indictment so that he might shift responsibility from 
himself to the grand jury by giving them the opportunity to quash the bill —  and 
himself the opportunity to enter nolle prosequi on the indictment. Unfortunately for 
the attorney-general and more so for the victim o f the prosecution, the grand jury did 
not rise to the bait. Had the grand jury thrown out the indictment, it is unthinkable 
that Archibald would have filed an ex officio information. Preferring an indictment 
was the lesser o f two evils because it imputed the reality as well as the appearance 
of constitutionalism and held out the realistic possibility that the grand jury might 
refuse to find ‘true bill’ on the indictment. Though the attorney-general had no 
choice but to act once he had been ordered to do so by government, he could 
nevertheless exercise prosecutorial discretion by choosing the less oppressive means 
of inaugurating the prosecution.
On 4 February 1835, Joseph Howe received from the attorney-general an official 
letter informing him that the crown intended to prosecute him for libel at the next 
term o f the Supreme Court, which was six days away. Howe published the full text 
o f the letter in the following day's edition o f the Novascotian. It was already the 
worst-kept secret in Halifax that the crown intended to proceed by way of 
indictment. Obviously, Howe was concerned that the chosen instrument might be 
the dreaded ex officio criminal information —  technically legal, and flourishing in 
Upper Canada under the Sedition A ct— and, that the attorney-general would not run 
the risk of the grand jury's quashing the indictment and compelling him to enter nolle 
prosequi.
Due to the overlong legislative session, Hilary Term 1835 in the Supreme Court 
had been statutorily delayed by one month.43 Chief Justice Brenton Halliburton, in 
his legislative capacity as president [speaker] o f the Council 'in general assembly 
conven'd', would not have been available to preside over any trials until the 
legislature had been prorogued — on 19 February. The same was true of 
Attorney-General Archibald, who, as speaker o f the House o f Assembly, would also
42 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 74.
43 (1834-35) 5 Wm. 4, c. 1 : An Act to alter the Sitting o f  the next ensuing Term o f  the Supreme Court at 
Halifax.
have been unavailable. Term commenced on Tuesday, 10 February, and was 
immediately adjourned for a week, there being no criminal business other than the 
indictment against Joseph Howe,44 which the attorney-general stated he would be 
prepared to submit to the grand jury on 17 February.
The grand jury for the year 1835 was impanelled on the opening day o f Hilary 
Term and formally charged by the chief justice.45 The date was later than usual, but 
in good time for the spring sitting o f the Quarter Sessions on 3 March. Both Howe's 
half-brother Joseph Austen and the two magistrates, James Noble Shannon and John 
Leander Starr, sought and received permission to withdraw when, on 17 February, 
the attorney-general came to the grand jury room and presented to the foreman an 
indictment against Joseph Howe for libel. Howe afterwards read into the record a 
passage from the now lost indictment which makes crystal clear that the charge was 
seditious libel:
The jurors of our Lord the King upon their oath present, that Joseph Howe, 
late of Halifax, in the County of Halifax, printer, being a wicked, seditious 
and ill-disposed person, and being a person of a most wicked and malicious 
temper and disposition ... [and] greatly disaffected to the administration of 
His Majesty’s Government in this Province, and wickedly, maliciously, and 
seditiously contriving, devising, and intending to stir up and excite
44 Howe does not appear on the Attomey-General's docket o f causes for Hilary Term 1835 : NSARM MG 
1, v. 89, doc. 250 (S.G. W. Archibald fonds).
45 The members o f  the grand jury were Joseph Austen, Edward Bartlett (foreman), Clement Horton 
Belcher, Stephen Newton Binney, William Anderson Black, Robert M. Brown, William Carritt, James 
Cogswell, Edward Cunard, Lawrence Hartshorne, William Hunter, William Kidston, Joshua Lee, 
William Macara, John Munro, Alexander Murison, William B.T. Piers, Andrew Belcher Richardson 
(secretary), Gasper Roast, William Biddolph Robertson, William Saltus, James Noble Shannon, John 
Leander Starr and John Williamson: “Extracts from the Minutes and proceedings o f  the Grand Jury 
for the County o f -  Halifax- Supreme Court /Hilary Term [1835]” NSARM RG 34-312 series P vol. 14. 
(Italics denote those members o f the grand jury who were afterwards appointed magistrates to fill 
vacancies by resignation resulting from the verdict in Howe-, four o f  the five, excluding only Binney, 
declined to serve as magistrates. Boldface denotes those members o f  the grand jury who were already 
magistrates.) Occupationally, as many as sixteen o f  the grand jurymen were merchants. There were also 
one bookseller, two doctors, one superannuated army officer, one newspaper proprietor, one grocer, one 
tradesman, and one unascertainable. By and large, the grand jury o f 1835, by comparison with its 
progressive reforming predecessors o f 1832 through 1834, was a neo-conservative, quasi-reactionary 
body dominated by merchants, and could hardly have been expected to side with Howe against the 
magistrates —  two o f whom were among its members. Moreover, both Shannon and J.L. Starr had 
signed the complaint to the lieutenant-governor which precipitated the prosecution.
discontent and sedition among His Majesty’s subjects....46
By 1835, criminal procedure had advanced to the point where proving 
publication o f the alleged libel, which formerly had been sufficient to convict the 
accused, was sufficient only to commit him for trial. The crown's only witness was 
Hugh Blackadar, editor o f the principal tory organ, the Halifax Journal, the 
proprietor o f which, John Munro, was also a member of the grand jury. Contrary to 
the practice in criminal defamation cases, the second letter from “The People,” 
which formed part o f the indictment, was ordered read — because the libel was a 
public or political one. After protracted discussion, a decision not having been 
reached, the grand jury adjourned for three days. When it resumed deliberations on 
20 February, three members absent without leave and the same three others excused, 
the eighteen members present returned true bill on the indictment; the trial was 
scheduled for Monday, 2 March 1835. “Previous to the Grand Jury coming to a 
decision,” reported the Novascotian on 26 February,
the Box containing the bill, and all their Records, was found to have been 
taken from the Jury Room — and no little confusion arose in consequence.
It was finally discovered in the Treasurer's Office, whither it had been 
carried by the Messenger of the House of Assembly, who presumed that it 
belonged to some of the Committees which usually occupied the room.
On 24 February, four days after the grand jury approved the indictment, the 
magistrates in a body went up to the Supreme Court and sought an interview with 
the Chief Justice. Speaking on behalf of his colleagues, Richard Tremain, the senior 
magistrate, read a resolution which he stated had been passed at a meeting o f the 
magistrates convened that morning, to the effect, “[t]hat it was resolved 
unanimously, that leave be asked o f this Honorable Court to grant to Mr Joseph 
Howe, in his defence at the approaching trial, every facility for substantiating, and 
proving the charges made by him in the Novascotian o f the 1st Jan. last.” His 
Lordship said, that such interference was out o f the usual course, that he considered 
it extra-judicial, and that he could take no notice of it. He referred them, however,
46 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 36-7 [emphasis added]. It is curious that Howe did not print the indictment 
in his pamphlet record o f  the trial: supra note 16. It has proved impossible to substantiate Roy’s claim 
that “the text o f  the indictment is to be found among George Johnson’s Papers relating to H ow e...”: J.A. 
Roy, Joseph Howe: A Study in Achievement and Frustration (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of 
Canada Ltd., 1935) at 49 n. 28. Johnson (1837-1911 ), who was appointed official biographer after the 
death o f  George Monro Grant in 1902, might very well have had the records o f the trial in his possession 
at some point.
to their counsel, the Attorney General, with whom they might consult upon the 
course to be adopted.”47
The same meeting of the Court o f Sessions which passed the extraordinary 
resolution respecting the accused, now that the prosecution was assured, also 
attended to other business arising therefrom. Another of the magistrates who had 
signed the complaint successfully moved a resolution that a retainer be paid out of 
the Police Magistrate's budget to barristers Charles Twining and James F. Gray as 
their counsel.48 It was further resolved that magistrates Dr Samuel Head and Richard 
Tremain, both o f whom had signed the complaint, and David Shaw Clarke, clerk of 
the peace, “be a Committee to superintend the progress of the Trial o f the Indictment 
against Mr Joseph Howe for a Libel upon the Magistrates.” The Twelve were 
nothing if not well organized and well prepared. “They [the magistrates] have taken 
six weeks to determine on this prosecution,” Howe was to observe during his 
defence, “leaving their adversary but a few days to prepare; and finally, they have 
brought their action by indictment, well knowing that the court could not admit 
evidence but on the side o f the Crown.”49
While Attorney-General Archibald's reasons for proceeding in a manner at 
variance with English practice in public libel prosecutions can be surmised, the 
grand jury's reasons for proceeding as they did are less clear. If the trial jury were 
to be the heroes o f the piece,50 then the grand jury were the villains —  or at least the 
anti-heroes. A body which, when Howe was a member of it in 1832, could be 
described as politically “militant,”51 had clearly undergone a sea change. The role 
o f the grand jury is the crux o f the Howe prosecution, because the political reasons 
for committing the accused for trial are too easily obscured by the legal machinery. 
Though the indictment is no longer extant, it is possible to know exactly what 
offence was charged. Connivance between the magistrates and the government, 
which led to the lieutenant-governor's ordering the attorney-general to prosecute,
47Acadian Recorder (Halifax): 28 Feb 1835. ForTremain's leading role in the affair, see D.A. Sutherland, 
“Tremain, Richard,” 8 Dictionary o f  Canadian Biography 892, who argues persuasively that “it was in 
character for Tremain to initiate the magisterial demand that Howe be tried for criminal libel.”
48 'Sessions / 1834', loc. cit.
49 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 33. Having read Murdoch, whose Epitome he published, Howe understood 
that the grand jury was “a court o f  preliminary enquiry in criminal matters”: Murdoch, supra note 40 
at 3:172.
50 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 82.
51 Joseph Howe, supra note 17 at 136.
was matched by connivance between the magistrates and the grand ju ry — which led 
to their finding true bill on the indictment. It is salient that the same two magistrates 
who were also members of the grand jury put their names to the request for a 
prosecution. This may help explain why most students o f the Howe case have 
neglected to investigate the central role played by the grand jury, who concluded that 
(in Howe's words) “the indictment in which I am charged with sedition and 
rebellion”52 was well enough supported by the crown's evidence to warrant a trial. 
The grand jury could have quashed the indictment on procedural or other grounds, 
or insisted that the author, rather than (or in addition to) the publisher o f the alleged 
libel be charged, and that the indictment be redrawn accordingly. They might have 
denied the innuendo (the construction placed by the crown on the alleged seditious 
words), or concluded that publication o f the alleged libel was immaterial, because 
the statements made in the letter were not seditious on the face o f them. 
Furthermore, they might have concluded that, since an action for libel lay where an 
indictment was sustainable, a private action rather than a public prosecution should 
have been brought. In short, the grand jury were under no obligation - except 
political - to return true bill on the indictment.
Though the grand jury had ample opportunity to quash the indictment, they 
chose instead not to run the risk of antagonizing the government by forcing the 
attorney-general either to discontinue the prosecution or to lay an ex officio criminal 
information. Returning true bill suggests timidity on the part o f the grand jury in the 
exercise o f their investigative function —  at least where political trials were 
concerned —  and their action was not even remotely comparable to the 
independence and assertiveness of earlier, reformist grand juries. If  the 
neo-conservative grand jury o f 1835 had been o f the same political stripe as that o f 
1834, then the bill would certainly have been rejected. Everything turned on the 
composition of the new grand juiy: whether to prosecute; whom to prosecute; by 
what means to prosecute.
The attorney-general, exercising his discretion in the interests o f the accused, 
took the high road o f indictment, which committed the crown to proving that the 
charge as laid warranted a trial on the evidence. Perhaps Archibald, who by his 
choice o f prosecutorial instrument had given the grand jury the power to act, was 
anticipating that they would quash the indictment, which in turn would have enabled 
him to enter nolle prosequi. He summoned one (and only one) highly objectionable 
and interested witness to speak to the indictment —  perhaps in order to suggest that
the charge was groundless and the prosecution malicious, and that the indictment 
should therefore be quashed. If  this was the strategy, it failed; the grand jury was 
'packed' as effectively as special juries for libel trials were in England before the 
passage of the Juries Act, 1825P
Archibald's chief concern throughout the preliminary hearing seems to have 
been to inculcate the notion that the crown had a weak case. Thus, he exercised his 
prosecutorial discretion in such a manner that the ill-advised proceeding reflected 
more on the complainant magistrates and on the government (who at the behest of 
the former gave the order to prosecute) than on either himself or on the accused — 
“a personal friend.”54 Archibald did not wish to emulate the example of the 
attorney-general o f England, Sir James Scarlett, who a few years before had been 
carrying on a series of political libel prosecutions, which “roused considerable 
resentment and were generally thought to have been a mistake.”55 Taking a longer 
view o f the political implications o f the prosecution than either the magistrates or the 
executive government, “Archibald was deliberately moderate, fully realizing that this 
was one jury trial he could not possibly win.”56 The attorney-general’s involvement 
was strictly ex officio; Archibald publicly dissociated himself from the magistrates 
and their quest for a prosecution.
According to McNaught, “[i]n cases where strong public emotions are aroused
—  such as those attaching to race or freedom o f the press —  it may be that the 
defendant is well advised to conduct his own courtroom defence.”57 Yet the main 
tendency in the historiography of Howe has been to denigrate the legal character and 
effectiveness o f Howe's defence, and to excuse the milquetoasts at the Halifax bar 
for failing to come to his defence. Whether or not Howe had a case was not for 
lawyers (much less historians) to prejudge, or for the trial judge to determine, but for
53 An omnibus Juries Act, consolidating and repealing four earlier acts, 1796 through 1833, was passed 
in Nova Scotia in 1838.
54 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 73.
55 J.R. Spencer, ‘T he Press and the Reform o f  Criminal Libel,” in P.R. Glazebrook, ed., Reshaping the 
Criminal Law: Essays in Honour o f  Glanville Williams (London: Stevens, 1978) 266 at 271 n. 33.
56 J.M. Beck, “Rise and Fall o f  Nova Scotia's Attorney General: 1749-1983” in J.A. Yogis, ed., Law in 
a Colonial Society: The Nova Scotia Experience (Toronto: Carswell, 1984) at 129. Beck's 
characterization o f  Archibald elsewhere in the same volume ( 130) as “the last non-party attorney general 
o f  Nova Scotia” speaks volumes about his discomfiture during the trial, though of course 'non-party' did 
not mean non-political.
57 McNaught, supra note 15 at 156 n. 22.
the jury to decide. Beck's statement, “[t]he suggestion that Howe could not get a 
lawyer to take his case has little basis in fact,”58 itself has little basis in fact. O f the 
handful o f lawyers whom Howe canvassed —  there were about thirty-six barristers 
resident and practising in Halifax in 18 3 559 —  none was prepared to accept his 
brief.60 Howe afterwards described the response o f the legal profession:61 “'I went,' 
said he, 'to two or three lawyers in succession, showed them the Attomey-General's 
notice of trial, and asked them if the case could be successfully defended? The 
answer was, No: there was no doubt that the letter was a [seditious] libel; that I must 
make my peace, or submit to fine and imprisonment'.”62 The lawyers excused 
themselves —  not because the defence case was weak legally, but because the 
crown's case was perceived to be far too strong politically. The bar was intimidated 
by the degree o f government interest in, and sponsorship of, the prosecution; in the 
forefront o f the collective memory stood Wilkie, an exemplary warning to lawyers 
not to act as public defenders o f accused seditionists. The lawyers were constrained 
by the Wilkie precedent, where the accused was indicted, tried, convicted and 
sentenced to prison for a libel on the magistrates o f Halifax, inter alia. Defending 
Howe, whose cause was assumed to be lost, was deemed a pointless risk, too 
dangerous to take. Perhaps, also, none o f the lawyers wanted to find himself in the 
unenviable position o f facing down Attorney-General Archibald, the recognized 
leader as well as ex officio head of the bar.
Thus, political considerations outweighed legal ones in the standoffishness of 
the Halifax bar. Even its most politically progressive members —  reform-minded 
lawyers such as James Boyle Uniacke, the brothers William and George Renny 
Young, Lawrence O'Connor Doyle and Alexander Stewart —  preferred not to 
commit themselves to the defence o f a newspaper editor charged with publishing a
58 Beck, Joseph Howe, supra  note 17 at 35.
59 This amounted to 45 per cent o f  the provincial bar, or about one lawyer for every 400 persons living 
on the Halifax peninsula at the time. The size and distribution o f  the bar can be computed from Belcher’s 
farm er’s almanack( 1832-1930); population figures derive from the 1827 census, cited by Howe in his 
defence: Chisholm, supra note 2 at 41 .
60 E.M. Saunders speculated that Howe could not obtain legal representation because o f his “social 
position”: E.M. Saunders, Three Premiers o f  Nova Scotia [Toronto: W. Briggs, 1909] at 56. Tradesmen
—  Howe was described as a “printer” in the indictment -  were not gentlemen.
61 Had Howe not been charged with seditious libel, he would have had no difficulty finding counsel. 
Thomas Forrester (the “Whig Radical”), charged with defamatory libel in 1825, had the cream o f  the bar 
appearing in his defence.
6- Thanks to Fox’s Libel Act, whether the publication was a libel, seditious or otherwise, was for the jury 
to decide.
seditious libel. Howe could not even count on friends and collaborators such as the 
former MHA, Beamish Murdoch, whose unsuccessful re-election bid in 1830 Howe 
had supported, and whose Epitome had only recently been published by Howe and 
printed on the Novascotian press. Nevertheless, Murdoch was one of the battery of 
lawyers present in court to witness Howe’s chastisement. Though sympathetic to 
Howe, Murdoch was not so careless o f his professional reputation and prospects as 
to have an accused seditionist for a client.63 So Howe was left entirely to his own 
devices, the victim of lawyers' lack of intestinal fortitude.
Joseph Howe was an autodidact whose only formal education was 
apprenticeship —  not to a lawyer, but to a printer. Having attended neither grammar 
school nor college, he had not enjoyed the privilege o f an academic education. Ten 
years earlier, however, before becoming a newspaper proprietor, Howe had 
seriously considered becoming a lawyer.64 It was to prove beneficial to his cause 
that Howe was both widely and deeply read, a believer in lifelong learning. In the 
brief time available to him between notice o f trial and its commencement— six days
—  he immersed himself in the legal literature, which consisted then of one or two 
English treatises on libel and extensive case law. Howe's command of the leading 
late 18th and early 19th-century English cases on seditious libel, as well as o f the 
pertinence o f Fox's Libel Act, in the passage o f which the struggle of newspaper 
editors and proprietors against public libel prosecutions had culminated, was to 
appear remarkably sure during the trial:
The law infers malice from the publication itself, and it throws the onus of 
rebutting that inference on the party accused. To rebut it, he must... explain 
the reasons for his conduct, and show that he was innocent from ignorance, 
or that some public exigency justified him in violating the strict rule of law.
... If this doctrine of intention were not clearly recognized by the English 
law and if the jury were not made the exclusive judges of the circumstances 
which influenced the accused, there would be no safety for the press, no 
freedom of discussion at all.*’5
Moreover, Howe made constructive use of the leading seditious libel cases reported
63 See generally P.V. Girard, “Patriot Jurist: Beamish Murdoch o f  Halifax, 1800-1876" (Ph.D. thesis, 
Dalhousie University, 1998) at 190 et seqq.
64 Howe to [Mrs Austen], 24 Nov 1824; cited in “Joseph Howe and the Bar” (1932) 10 Can. Bar Rev 
597.
65 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 64.
in the first (pre-1820) series o f Howell's State Trials.66 He also quoted Blackstone, 
and Thomas Starkie (“an eminent authority on the law o f libel”)67 —  the first 
American edition of whose treatise appeared in 1826, and who remained the leading 
English authority on libel throughout the nineteenth century.68
Howe also quoted Hone's Trials and read into the record four stanzas o f one of 
William Hone's parodies o f the Book o f Common Prayer (The Political Litany), as 
a result o f which Hone, a London bookseller, was prosecuted in the Court o f King's 
Bench. Hone underwent three trials in as many days in December 1817 on ex officio 
informations for blasphemous libel.69 Like Howe, Hone defended himself 
eloquently and was acquitted in what was generally regarded as a landmark decision 
for the liberty o f the press. His use, however jocular, of'subversive' material such 
as Hone's Trials suggests that Howe was consciously positioning himself within the 
English tradition o f radical printers, exemplified in late-eighteenth-century London 
by John Stockdale, whose successful defence (by Thomas Erskine) to a charge of 
seditious libel led directly to the passage of Fox’s Libel Act.70
Those scholars who quote the old saw about a fool for a client neglect the very 
material fact that Howe was not the defendant in a private action but the accused in 
a public prosecution. Had he been charged with treason or a felony, rather than a 
high misdemeanour, the court would have appointed a barrister to defend him.71 As 
it was, the most that Howe was able to obtain from the bar was not legal 
representation but the loan o f treatises and law reports, from which he crammed for
66 He cited or quoted R. v. Stockdale, ( 1789) 22 St. Tr. 237 (K.B.) —  ex officio information for seditious 
libel; R. v. Perry e t al., (1793) 22 St. Tr. 953 (K.B.) —  ex officio information for seditious libel; R. v. 
Shipley [Dean o f St Asaph], (1783-84) 21 St. Tr. 847 (K.B.) —  indictment for seditious libel; R. v. 
Peltier, (1803) 28 St. Tr. 529 (K.B.) —  ex officio information for public defamatory libel; R. v. Rowan, 
( 1793-94) 22 St. Tr. 1033 (K.B.) Ir. —  ex officio information for seditious libel; and R. v. Reeves, ( 1796)
26 St. Tr. 529 (K.B.) —  ex officio information for seditious libel.
67 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 35-6, 64-5.
68 T. Starkie, A [Practical] Treatise on the Law o f  Slander, Libel, Scandalum Magnatum, and False 
Rumour, E.D. Ingraham, ed. (New York, 1826 [1st American ed.]).
69 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 67 (“Hone's Trials”). Howe would have consulted one o f  the numerous 
contemporary editions o f  The Three Trials o f  William Hone, fo r  Publishing Three Parodies (London, 
1818); none o f  Hone’s three trials was reported.
70 “[Thomas] Erskine, through whose exertions the Declaratory Act [Fox’s Libel Act] was passed, 
confirming the right o f  juries to decide on the law and the facts, and whose views o f  the true bearing o f  
the law o f libel are now generally recognized...”: Chisholm, supra note 2 at 66. '
71 On this subject generally see Murdoch, supra note 40 at 190.
a week. While Howe was thus preparing for his day in court, the lawyers were 
looking backwards some fifteen years to the Wilkie, where an easy conviction had 
been obtained by the same king’s counsel who was now prosecuting 
attorney-general.
The Trial
J.R. Spencer's evocation o f “the machinery by which political libel trials used to be 
stage-managed [in England] — ex officio criminal informations and special juries”72
— applies in the latter, though not the former respect to Nova Scotia, which held its 
first seditious libel prosecution against a newspaper only aftersuch proceedings “had 
largely died out in England.”73 On Monday, 2 March 1835, R. v. Howe came to trial 
in the Supreme Court before Chief Justice Brenton Halliburton and a special jury. 
According to Spencer’s narrative o f English practice, “the trial was further 
stage-managed in that a special jury was usually summoned to hear it — on the 
usually correct hypothesis” that a hand-picked or packed jury would “have little 
sympathy with radicals.”74 Indeed, the very fact that a special jury was summoned, 
in term time, to try an indictment emphasizes the political character o f the 
prosecution, and was only possible because there was no other criminal business on 
the docket. Howe “laboured ... under the difficulty that the special juries in libel 
cases were chosen from the grand jury panels, whose members, because of large 
property qualifications, were likely to be heavily tory in complexion.”75 The petit 
jury, five of whom had served with Howe on the “militant” grand jury in 1832, and 
three others o f whom had served on the grand jury the following year, instead 
consisted largely of merchants and tradesmen.76 The court-appointed foreman was
72 Spencer, supra note 11 at 387.
73 Spencer, supra note 55 at 273. Elsewhere, however, Spencer points out that “political libel 
prosecutions ... continued in large numbers for the next 40 years [after the passage o f  Fox's Libel Act], 
and in many o f  the cases the government was seeking to silence discussion o f  what would now 
indisputably be regarded as legitimate topics o f public interest”: Spencer, supra note 11 at 385. The 
analogy with Howe is obvious.
74 The summoning o f a special jury was one o f a number o f distinguishing features which marked out 
political libel prosecutions: Spencer, supra note 11 at 384.
75 J.M. Beck, “Nugent, Richard” 8 Dictionary o f  Canadian Biography 657. (The reference is to an action 
for private libel, but applies equally to a prosecution for public libel.)
76 Beck gives a helpful prosopography o f  the trial jury: Joseph Howe, supra note 17 at 136; cf. 
Sutherland, supra note 21 at 264 n. 77. Sutherland's occupational analysis shows one butcher, six 
merchants, one ship chandler, one “gentleman” and three tradesmen. Five o f  the jury were serving 
magistrates (“It may appear strange to you, gentlemen, that when I found that five magistrates had been
Charles John Hill, a failed auctioneer and former business partner of the police 
magistrate, John Liddell, one o f the twelve magistrates who had signed the 
complaint. The accused, unrepresented by counsel, was arraigned and pleaded not 
guilty.
In some respects, the proceeding must have been more painful for the 
attorney-general than for the accused. Archibald held no brief for the complainant 
magistrates, whose motives he distrusted, and who had not consulted him on whether 
to bring a prosecution charging Howe “with sedition and rebellion.”77 Conscious 
that his very appearance as chief crown prosecuting attorney screamed government 
involvement, Archibald confined himself to having the last word to the jury. Despite 
his avowed disinclination “to ride upon the prerogative of the Crown”78 by laying an 
ex officio criminal information —  as the attorney-general ofN ew  Brunswick had 
done in Hooper —  Archibald did not hesitate to exercise his prerogative right of 
reply, though the defendant had called no witnesses.79
The task of presenting the crown’s case fell to one o f the magistrates’ retained 
counsel —  James F. Gray —  who, though a well-regarded lawyer of ten years' 
standing, was to prove no match for the accused. His having been retained by the 
magistrates, moreover, helps to explain why it was Gray, rather than the 
solicitor-general or one o f the king’s counsel, who presented the crown’s case. This 
was contrary to regular practice and underlines the unusual circumstances 
surrounding the genesis o f the prosecution. Gray explained the indictment without 
direct reference to its “seditious” aspects; showed how Fox’s Libel Act had altered 
criminal procedure bearing on libel; and defended both the mode of proceeding 
(indictment rather than information) and the choice of indictee (publisher rather than 
author). He justified the choice by reference to the common-law principle that it is 
publication which makes libel criminal. As chief crown attorney, Gray was at pains 
to defend the magistrates for soliciting the prosecution. But arguing that the
drawn upon the panel, I did not strike them o f f ’): Chisholm, supra note 2 at 48, 24. One prospective 
juror, a former magistrate whose identity was not revealed, asked to be excused and was. It appears 
strange indeed that a former magistrate should have disqualified himself from serving, while five current 
ones went unchallenged by the accused.
77 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 52; cf. 3 7 ,3 8 ,4 0  (“discontent and sedition”), 52 (“sedition and rebellion”),
71 and 72 (“mutiny and sedition”).
78 For the text o f the attomey-generaPs reply see Chisholm, supra note 2 at 73-9.
79 This right o f reply reserved to the attorney-general was similar to the prerogative exercisable in 
England, where prosecuting counsel had no such right unless a law officer; see Wright, supra note 4 at 
18.
magistrates as a public body could not seek redress by private action did not explain 
why Howe was being prosecuted for sedition rather than defamation.
Referring to Fox’s Libel Act, Gray made clear the crown's assumption that the 
Act was good law in Nova Scotia. He proceeded to expound at some length the 
application of this act, by means of which the fact-finding powers of libel juries were 
very considerably enhanced, where, previously, responsibility for publication had 
been the only matter within the purview of the criminal trial jury. There was much 
more to the ju ry’s role than simply determining whether the libel was seditious; they 
were to determine whether there was a libel.
When Gray finished his address, the crown's only witness was called but refused 
to answer. Printer Hugh Blackadar,80 perhaps suspecting that he was being 
manipulated by the powers that were in order to repress “a fellow-publisher and 
liberal,”81 declined to testify when summoned. He was only spared a citation for 
civil contempt by the accused's readiness to testify against himself and the court’s 
willingness to rule the evidence admissible. No defence counsel would ever have 
permitted an accused to incriminate himself by turning King’s evidence. The 
prothonotary then read the alleged seditious libel in open court, which was routine 
procedure in sedition and the other public libels —  but not in defamation. When the 
accused enquired whether he was not entitled to know the names o f the “prosecutors 
... [t]he Chief-Justice answered that the court knew nothing on that subject; they 
referred to the Attorney-General.”82 This ruling clarified the nature of the 
prosecution as a political or state trial; the attorney-general, as chief law officer of 
the crown, appeared in his place to help prosecute a crime against the state. Though 
Howe was perhaps a little uncertain as to the procedure in sedition trials, neither he 
nor anyone else could have been ignorant o f the nature o f the libel charged and the 
purpose of the prosecution.
There were no crown witnesses to cross-examine, the accused having offered 
himself as chief and sole witness for the prosecution, nor could defence witnesses 
be called. After the prothonotary read into the record the alleged seditious libel,
80 As an employee o f  John Munro's Halifax Journal, Blackadar was doubtless expected to toe the 
proprietorial line in support o f  the magistrates. The proprietor himself, Munro, was disqualified from 
testifying for the crown because he was a member o f  the grand jury which had returned true bill on the 
indictment.
81 L.K. Kemaghan [Yorke], “Blackadar, Hugh William” 9 Dictionary o f  Canadian Biography 54.
82 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 30.
which the accused admitted to having published in his newspaper, Howe 
immediately began the presentation o f the defence case. His famous speech —  it 
took six-and-one-quarter hours to deliver— was divided into two distinct parts, fact 
and law. The first, and by far the larger, attempted to disprove seditious intention 
by adducing the facts on which “The People’s” statements were based, and arguing 
that the publication o f what was true and in the public’s interest to know could not 
amount to a seditious libel. The second deployed to maximum effect Fox’s Libel Act 
and English case law. Howe’s strategy was “to rebut the legal inference of 
malice,”83 with a view to disproving seditious intention. He aimed to turn the tables 
on his prosecutors by persuading the jury that the imputation of malice rested with 
the magistrates for soliciting the prosecution. If  the government took the view that 
the magistrates had been defamed in the exercise of their public duty, then Howe 
would demonstrate to the jury that there was no sedition because there was no 
defamation.
Constrained by neither professional knowledge nor precedent (the Wilkie 
verdict), Howe defended himself against the charge o f sedition as if he had been 
entering a plea to an action for defamation. Howe believed that he could make out 
a complete defence to the charge —  not to justify the publication of a seditious libel, 
but rather to demonstrate his bona fides. By launching an all-out attack on the 
magistrates, Howe succeeded in turning the ju ry’s attention away from the 
government which had ordered him prosecuted for sedition, to the magistrates whom 
“The People” had allegedly defamed. His careful preparation, political astuteness 
and intuitive, Erskinian understanding of the potential o f Fox’s Libel Act enabled 
Howe to exploit not only the resources o f criminal trial procedure, but also the 
government’s sheer misjudgement in ordering the attorney-general to proceed 
against him. He also contrived to turn the prosecution into a judicial test o f the 
liberty of the press —  a feat which gave rise to the durable myth, fostered by Howe 
himself, that by his acquittal he had established freedom of the press in Nova Scotia. 
No one has since bothered to ask whether it was unfree before; it was not.
The larger part o f Howe's speech consisted of a very detailed exegesis o f the 
content o f the alleged libel. It was so detailed that one suspects that Howe must have 
inspired, if not actually ghost-written the second letter from “The People.” Perhaps 
he wished to inculcate in the minds of the jury the notion that truth and public 
benefit might be a defence to seditious libel if mens rea could thereby be disproved. 
Like Crown attorney Gray, therefore, Howe lost no time invoking Fox’s Libel Act,
the significance of which he understood only too well:
Formerly, in cases of libel, instead of the jury being called on to give a 
general verdict, founded on their own view of the law and the facts, they 
were directed to determine only whether the matter in question had been 
published by the party arraigned; and if it had, the judge assumed his guilt, 
and a wicked minister often awarded the punishment... Men charged with 
libel are not now to be tried by the mere fact of publication, nor even by the 
tendency of what they print, though that may be most evil and injurious, but 
as they are tried for all other crimes — by the intention, the motive, with 
which they committed the act.84
Howe criticized the magistrates for taking refuge behind the shield o f crime against 
the state: “If  they were serious, why did they not bring their action on the case, lay 
their damages, and submit their administration to the most ample inquiry?” They 
doubtless knew, as did Howe from his study of libel (both crime and tort), that the 
truth o f the allegations would have made a complete defence to an action for 
defamation. However, under the mistaken impression that it was the magistrates 
who had elected to proceed by way of a criminal prosecution/5 Howe accused the 
magistrates o f “well knowing that the [Supreme] court could not admit evidence but 
on the side of the Crown.”86 Howe could not have known that the complainants had 
had no say at all in the prosecution beyond soliciting it.
The legal heart o f Howe's defence is best summed up in his own words. “In the 
trial o f indictment for libel,” he declaimed, with a firm grasp of how to rebut the 
legal inference of malice from the publication itself, by disproving criminal 
intention,
as their worships the magistrates very well know, the defendant is not 
allowed to prove the truth of his publication, and therefore is cut off from 
what, in an action on the case, is often his strong ground of defence. But he 
has the privilege of explaining to the juiy anything which may illustrate the 
motives and intentions by which he was influenced, to satisfy them, that so 
far from wishing to provoke a breach of the peace — so far from incurring 
the guilt of which he stands accused, that his motive was praiseworthy, his 
intentions honourable, and his act demanded by the circumstances in which
*4 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 31 -32, cf. 66.
xs “[A]n ex officio information could not have been filed, but upon the oaths o f the parties charged, 
negativing the truth o f the charge”: Chisholm, supra note 2 at 74. Of course, this provision applied only 
in cases o f  defamation.
he was placed. This privilege I shall now proceed to exercise. It is one that 
the court will not deny, as it is so essential to the safety of persons similarly 
accused.87
Howe's object was to rebut the legal inference of malice, and thus defeat the 
accusation o f libel by disproving seditious intention. His task was to demonstrate 
that the letter which he had published was not a libel —  not because it was not 
defamatory, but because it was not seditious. By in effect pleading justification, a 
doctrine which has yet to penetrate sedition law, Howe inverted the common-law 
maxim to read, “the greater the truth the less the libel” —  absente malitia. The most 
paradoxical aspect o f his defence is that Howe anticipated the modem truth and 
public benefit defence to criminal defamation —  neither then nor now a defence to 
seditious libel —  in order to disprove seditious intention. This was the heart o f the 
matter. In doing so, he eviscerated the charge against him.
The proceeding should have ended there. But the attorney-general being present
—  it was after all a prosecution by the state —  Archibald exercised his prerogative 
right to follow the defence. Despite having “the strategic advantage of the last word 
to the jury (which was not enjoyed by other prosecutors),”88 Archibald was not 
nearly so well prepared as Gray, because he had not presented the crown case, as he 
had done in Wilkie when a mere king’s counsel. The contrast with Howe could not 
have been greater: “I asked them [the lawyers] to lend me their books, gathered an 
armful, threw myself on a sofa, and read libel law for a week. By that time I had 
convinced myself that they were wrong, and that there was a good defence, if the 
case were properly presented to the court and jury.”89
Even in seditious libel proceedings instituted by means o f regular indictment, the 
attorney-general’s de facto  monopoly over criminal prosecutions worked to the 
crown’s advantage. In neither Wilkie nor Howe was the crown’s case conducted 
personally by one o f the law officers. In Howe, on the other hand, Attorney-General 
Archibald, well realizing the political importance o f the prosecution, exercised “the 
right to make the strategically-important last address to the jury.”90 In English 
practice —  honoured more in the breach than the observance in Nova Scotia —  the 
defence was given the tactical advantage of the right to address the jury last, unless
87 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 34.
88 Wright, supra note 4 at 18.
89 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 23.
90 Wright, supra note 4 at 51 -52.
a law officer had led for the crown. No basis to claim that right existed in Howe: the 
prosecution had not been brought by ex officio criminal information; unlike Wilkie, 
a king’s counsel did not prosecute; the solicitor-general did not appear; and the 
attorney-general did not present the crown’s case. After the first appointment in 
1817 o f king’s counsel to appear for the crown in criminal proceedings, the law 
officers seldom prosecuted personally, even in Halifax. The attorney- or solicitor- 
general ’ s presence came to represent not the crown prosecutorial but the government 
as de facto  prosecutor. Howe was an example of a sedition proceeding undertaken 
by law agents acting indirectly for the government91 —  in this case, one of the 
magistrates’ two retained counsel.
The accused can be forgiven for not knowing enough to object to the 
attorney-general’s abuse o f due process. Yet scarcely had Archibald risen to reply 
when he was interrupted by Chief Justice Halliburton, “who said that as the hour was 
late, and the jury had been confined so long, it would be better to adjourn the court.” 
Beamish Murdoch —  an amicus curiae— “remonstrated; Mr. H ow e... had brought 
his defence to a close much sooner than intended in order to avoid the necessity of 
adjourning the trial. It would be unfair, therefore, to allow the other side the 
advantage of the night to reconstruct their case.” The accused dissociated himself 
from this well-meaning intervention. Howe's work was done; the jury's had not yet 
begun. “The jury were consulted, and the foreman expressed their wish to remain; 
it was therefore determined to do so, but the crowd and the excitement being so 
great, and the difficulty o f preserving order evident, his Lordship adjourned the 
court.”92
The trial resumed on Tuesday morning, 3 March. Attorney-General Archibald 
was at pains to deny the newspaper report in which the magistrates had been advised 
to consult with him as 'their counsel': “I am not the retained counsel o f these parties; 
... My learned friends [Twining and Gray] who have conducted this case are their 
counsel.”93 Archibald wanted to nourish the impression that he was watching 
counsel on behalf o f the government - nothing more. The real reason, of course, was 
that the government, whose servant Archibald was, wanted to distance itself from the 
possible consequences o f its own actions. Archibald also reiterated the procedural 
point made by Gray, namely that “no private action would lie upon publication [of
91 “Most sedition cases in Britain were conducted by an individual taking a government reward or an 
agent retained by the state”: Wright, supra note 4 at 18 n. 30.
92 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 72-73.
93 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 73.
a seditious libel].”94 This was not mere criminal libel - defamation; this was sedition. 
“That is not the law as respects public bodies,” stated Archibald. “It does not allow 
the defendant to escape in this way.” The attorney-general then sketched the 
common-law crime o f sedition, omitting Fox’s Libel Act, which had already been 
covered by lead counsel.95 Archibald's contention that the defendant's rebuttal o f the 
crown's inference o f malice was “unknown to the law” differed from Howe’s 
constructive application o f the Act, according to which the jury was not required to 
convict solely on the basis o f the sense ascribed to the alleged libel in the indictment. 
In other words, the effect o f construing the Act as Howe did was to undermine the 
common-law rule that the intention of the writer is to be gathered from the words 
written. The accused had argued forcefully that if the crown had the right to infer 
malice from the content o f the alleged libel, then the jury had the right to reject that 
inference, and to determine on other grounds the presence or absence of seditious 
intention.
Recognizing the weak self-interestedness o f the crown's case, Archibald focused 
more on its procedural than on its substantive aspects. Indeed, he came dangerously 
close to suggesting that the government had prosecuted for sedition in order to 
forestall the magistrates impoliticly initiating an action for defamation:
If the nature of the charge [against the magistrates] would have allowed of 
a private prosecution, the defendant would then have been obliged to put his 
justification upon the record, and to prove the truth of it by witnesses placed 
in the box and examined on oath, not by hearsay, nor even by the report of 
a committee of His Majesty's Council.96
Descending to Howe’s level, Archibald betrayed grudging admiration for the 
effectiveness o f the defence case by appearing to dispute the truth of the allegations 
made by “The People.” The attorney-general’s discomfort showed in his 
extraordinary admission: “had the author been given up, I would not have proceeded 
against the publisher.”97 The argument was not only disingenuous but circular,
94 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 74; cf. 27.
95 “The law in regard to seditious libel is as it was before the passage o f Cox’s [sic: Fox’s] Libel Act”: 
McLachlan v. R., (1923) 56 N.S.R. 413 at 417 (N.S.S.C. in Banco), p er  Harrington, counsel for the 
appellant.
96 The report to which Archibald was referring had been presented on 26 Jan 1835: Minutes o f Council, 
NSARM RG 1 vol. 196. The appointment o f the committee resulted from Lieutenant-Governor 
Campbell's having tabled in Council the address from the former grand jury, critical o f the Court o f  
Sessions, which Howe (at the request o f  the foreman) published in the Novascotian on 10 Dec. 1834.
97 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 77.
because the aim o f the prosecution was not to stop “The People” from writing letters, 
but to stop Howe from publishing attacks on the magistrates in the columns o f the 
Novascotian.
Archibald used Howe's ignorance o f criminal procedure as an excuse to brag 
about his own restrained exercise of prosecutorial discretion: “He [the accused] was 
under a misapprehension ... when he supposed that an ex-officio information could 
not have been filed, but upon the oaths of the parties charged, negativing the truth 
o f the charge.”98 Archibald was gilding the lily, for he knew better than anyone that 
all that could be proved against Howe was publication, which was sufficient to make 
the indictment for seditious libel stick. Proving seditious libel was another matter, 
and that accounts for the strain and ambiguity discernible in Archibald's summation, 
as well as for the palpable tension between himself and the chief justice —  political 
opponents and very unevenly matched lawyers.
Though Archibald's notion o f the responsibility of the press did not dovetail with 
Howe's notion o f its freedom,99 it seems most unlikely that he would have advised 
government to prosecute Howe for seditious libel had his advice been sought or 
followed. Unfortunately, it was not; the lieutenant-governor had apparently been 
soliciting, receiving and acting upon political advice from his confidential advisers, 
who knew less law than the accused and far less about political trials as the art o f the 
possible than did the attorney-general, who was an experienced politician. Though 
Archibald ridiculed the defence as mere “assertion without proof,” he was 
nevertheless careful to answer the procedural argument that the magistrates could 
and should have brought an action for defamation. Howe's speculation that the 
magistrates forwent such a proceeding in order to deprive him o f his sure defence 
was too close to the truth to go unanswered. Had the government not directed the 
attorney-general to prosecute for sedition in order to prevent the truth from 
triumphing as it undoubtedly would have done in a civil proceeding? Among the 
procedural advantages o f the public prosecution over the private action were that the 
magistrates did not have to swear that the charges were false (when they knew them 
to be true), and that if the prosecution failed the costs would be borne by the crown. 
Perhaps it was all for the best. Archibald's vague admonitions about the
98 This important distinction between ex officio and private criminal informations, which were not 
abolished in England until 1938, was further developed by Chief Justice Halliburton in his charge to the 
jury: “A private party may have his information, but then he must come into court and swear that the 
charges are false”: Chisholm, supra note 2 at 80.
99 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 71-72.
inadmissibility o f hearsay evidence and the immateriality of the truth of a libel fell 
on deaf ears —  despite his reminding the jury that Howe had “stated a great variety 
o f things which could not be evidence, which are mere hearsay, and which the court 
would not have permitted counsel to use.”100 But the great variety of things which 
Howe had stated were not meant to be evidence. Howe’s defence was built on the 
bedrock o f law, not the sand o f  fact; and it was as ingenious as it was brilliant in its 
simplicity.
The proceeding must have induced in Chief Justice Halliburton a sense o f déjà 
vu; he had been on the bench in 1820, when Chief Justice Sampson Salter Blowers 
delivered his charge to the jury in Wilkie.m Fifteen years later, Halliburton, having 
succeeded Blowers in 1833, now found himself presiding over only the second 
seditious libel trial to have occurred in the province. The charge was a congeries o f 
evasion, irrelevancy and prejudication, which strikingly illustrated Halliburton’s too 
limited experience at the bar; as a lawyer, the chief justice was much the inferior of 
his contemporary, the attorney-general. Indeed, the only constructive parts o f his 
charge were those which regurgitated the attorney-general’s reply. Like Archibald 
before him, Halliburton was at pains to explain the nature o f the prosecution in order 
to justify, if not cloak, its purpose. As the trial proceeded, it became clear that it was 
the crown, not the accused, that was on the defensive. Again like Archibald, 
Halliburton enumerated only to eliminate the other possible ways of proceeding — 
private prosecution, action for defamation, etc. —  arguing very unconvincingly that 
it was necessary for the crown to act because it was impossible for the magistrates 
to do so.
Though there was nothing positively erroneous in the chief justice's restatement 
of the law, Halliburton misrepresented the defence case by observing, “[t]he course 
taken by the defendant has not been to induce you to believe that this paper is not a 
libel.” 102 In fact the opposite was true; Howe had been at pains to persuade the jury 
that the letter was not a libel. Moreover, he strove to rebut the legal inference of 
malice (false defamation about public officials in relation to their official capacity) 
by arguing that demonstrated truth and public benefit positively disproved seditious 
intention. Having drunk deeply from Thomas Erskine's speeches, Howe stood 
four-square on Fox’s Libel Act, which was conspicuous by its absence from both the
100 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 74.
101 Halliburton, then senior puisne judge, also presided at the trial o f Forrester for defamatory libel in 
1825: Halifax Journal, 24 Jan. 1825.
102 Chisholm, supra note 2 at 81.
attomey-general's summation and the chief justice's charge to the jury. One could 
get the impression that procedure in criminal libel had not undergone any statutory 
reformation whatsoever.
Despite his failure to draw the jury's attention to Fox’s Libel Act, it is clear from 
the chief justice's charge that §2 o f the Act, whereby “the Court shall give their 
Opinion and Directions on the Matter in Issue, as in other Criminal Cases,” 
prescribed the procedure actually followed. Halliburton gave his opinion that “the 
paper charged is a libel, and your duty is, to state by your verdict that it is libellous.” 
By expressing himself thus, however, he misdirected the jury, for it was by no means 
their duty by their verdict to declare that the paper was a libel but rather to determine 
whether it was a libel. Halliburton went even further by pointing out to the jury the 
implications o f a verdict o f not guilty: if the publication was not seditious, neither 
then could it be falsely defamatory —  the very point which Howe had been 
endeavouring to prove. Halliburton's instruction would have carried greater weight 
if Fox’s Libel Act had not passed or was not in force in Nova Scotia. As matters 
stood, however, the trial judge appeared to misdirect the jury as to their powers 
under the Act. The ju ry ’s duty was not simply to rubber-stamp the accused’s 
admission that he had published the alleged seditious libel. Not to be misled by the 
trial judge’s misdirection and non-direction, the jury disregarded his instructions 
and, in but twice the time it took to convict Wilkie (about five minutes), acquitted 
Howe.
Conclusion
Howe was the first, and would be the only, acquittal o f an accused seditionist in 
Nova Scotia. “Your verdict will be the most important in its consequences ever 
delivered before this tribunal,” Howe admonished the jury in his defence, implying 
that the liberty o f the press might be in jeopardy if it were to find against him.103 A 
defence which persuaded a trial jury, applying Fox’s Libel Act, to return a verdict of 
not guilty cannot reasonably be described as “from the point o f view of the 
law...magnificently irrelevant.” 104 Such an interpretation ignores the truism that the
103 Cf. “... your verdict will protect me to-day against the persecution o f the sessions”: Chisholm, supra 
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Howe himself, under the extreme pressure o f  the moment, knew better than his biographer that Fox’s 
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jury was ultimately the judge o f both law and fact. The trial judge could only advise 
and warn, direct and instruct —  and then consent to the verdict, regardless o f what 
it was. The jury's responsibility in sedition cases was greater still because there was 
no clear, positive law defining seditious libel;105 that was for the courts to determine 
by reference to case law. As part o f received English criminal procedure — 
consistent with Nova Scotia’s common-law reception protocol —  Fox’s Libel Act 
was deemed automatically to be in force. It was declaratory, affirmative and 
ameliorative o f the common law o f libel, and tended to enhance the liberty o f the 
subject. To be sure, both Attorney-General Archibald and Chief Justice Halliburton 
passed over in deafening silence an Act which they knew to be the strongest weapon 
in Howe's tiny legal arsenal. However, Gray had already elucidated it in presenting 
the crown’s case; and the accused made much of it in his defence. The attorney- 
general and the chief justice may therefore have concluded that the less said about 
it the better. They could hardly have taken exception to Howe’s account o f it, which 
was correct and compelling in every way.
The suggestion that the law was disregarded by the jury is likewise mistaken. 
The opposite is true; the law was scrupulously regarded by a jury exercising their 
prerogative under Fox’s Libel Act to give a general verdict on the evidence. They 
found that there was no seditious libel, not because the statements in “The People” 
were true or because their publication by the accused had been for the public benefit, 
but because there was no seditious intention. Howe’s forensic enabled the jury to 
infer absence o f malice from truth and public benefit, these being the two elements 
which would afterwards combine in the Libel Act, 1843 (“Lord Campbell's Act”) to 
form the justification defence to criminal defamation. That the crown inferred 
malice from the publication, without attempting to prove seditious intention, was an 
attempt to presume the accused guilty, as it were, until he could prove himself 
innocent.
The verdict in Howe demonstrates that Fox’s Libel Act could redound to the 
benefit o f the accused in sedition. The Act provided Howe with scope to rebut the 
legal inference of malice, which operated as a presumption o f guilt. Howe destroyed 
the crown's case against him and pointedly gave the jury that “clear and distinct 
direction” which was not forthcoming from the trial judge: “Their lordships [sz'c] will
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tell you that you are the sole judges o f the fact and o f the law; and that although 
every word o f what I have published were false, and its tendency most injurious, that 
you are to try me solely by the motive and intention by which I was controlled.”106 
Though his lordship was to say none o f those things, the jury had been well enough 
instructed in law by the accused. Howe galvanized the jury to the full exercise of 
their powers on the verdict which Fox’s Libel Act had confirmed to them. Chief 
Justice Halliburton was not the skilled and experienced lawyer that his predecessor 
Blowers had been, and Blowers (a former attorney-general) had stated the law much 
more succinctly and accurately before sending the Wilkie case to the jury fifteen 
years earlier. Nor was Wilkie so astute or learned a self-defender as Howe. He did 
not grasp that demonstrating the truth and public benefit o f an alleged seditious libel 
was useful only if it tended to disprove seditious intention.
Though the bar was, for Howe, the career path not taken, he had conducted an 
intensive study o f both the state-trials case law and the treatises. By no means 
“magnificently irrelevant” from the point of view o f law, Howe's defence exploited 
to the full the resources o f criminal procedure. Though the accused undoubtedly 
“stated a great variety o f things which could not be evidence,”107 he had also stated 
more law than either the attorney-general in his summation or the chief justice in his 
charge to the jury. To the extent to which doubts respecting the function of juries 
in libel cases were removed by Fox’s Libel Act, Howe construed the remedial statute 
liberally. Hence the correctness of the jury's decision “to take its view o f libel, not 
from Archibald, not from Halliburton, but from Howe, and bring in a verdict o f ‘not 
guilty.’”108 Despite the brilliance of his forensic oratory, Howe's triumph was more 
forensic than oratorical in character. To paraphrase Beck,109 the accused had in 
effect convinced the jury that the procedural law applicable to their function in a 
seditious libel case empowered them honourably to acquit him.
The crown’s case had failed, but no actions or private prosecutions for 
defamation were brought as a result. Two days after the verdict, ten magistrates, 
including eight o f the twelve complainants and three o f the magistrates whom Howe 
had criticized by name in his defence, met to consider their response to Howe’s 
acquittal. A resolution to “institute proceedings” for defamation was tabled but
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voted down by a margin o f four to three — with three o f the magistrates 
abstaining.110 It was not as though “The People” and its publisher were criticizing 
the magistrates (who were not lawyers) in their judicial capacity, but rather in their 
governmental character. If Howe had been alleging judicial rather than fiscal 
corruption on the part o f the magistrates, then the executive government would have 
had much stronger grounds for ordering that he be prosecuted. (Moreover, Philip 
Girard's argument that Howe's radical “Free Trade in Law” bill o f 1850 was 
ideologically continuous with his sedition trial fifteen years earlier would be more 
persuasive.111) Howe, unlike William Wilkie, was by no means so foolish as to 
attack the administration of justice in the Quarter Sessions or the Inferior Court of 
Common Pleas.
Had Howe completed his monographic “History of the Struggle for Responsible 
Government” [ca. 1842], the seventh of the twenty-odd chapters of which dealt with 
his sedition trial, we would have a better idea o f how he viewed its significance in 
the context o f a political struggle, which he thought was over but which was in 
reality about to enter its final, twelve-year-long phase.112 How then do we make 
sense o f the seditious-libel proceeding against Howe? Its very notoriety belies the 
fact that sedition proceedings were comparatively rare in the criminal justice history 
of Nova Scotia. The difficulty lies in liberating the trial from the decontextualized 
politico-biographical approach which has dominated the historiography, much to the 
detriment of sociolegal history. What is needed is an analysis o f sedition in Nova 
Scotia which takes into account the insights o f historical criminology. Perhaps the 
most unsatisfactory aspect o f Beck's Howe is that he characterizes the successful 
civil actions for private defamatory libel brought against the radical reformer, 
Richard Nugent, Howe's successor as editor o f the Novascotian, as “political” or as 
“state” trials, but withholds such apt and accurate descriptors from the sedition trial 
o f Joseph Howe, to which they are far more applicable. What was true o f Nugent 
in 1843 was true a fortiori o f Howe eight years earlier: he appeared to be the target
110 Court o f  Sessions minutes, under date 5 Mar. 1835. Mover o f the resolution was J.L. Starr, seconder 
John Howe Jr. (I owe this reference to the unpublished research of D.C. Harvey: NSARM MG 1 vol. 441 
f. 108.)
111 P. Girard, “Married Women's Property, Chancery Abolition, and Insolvency Law: Law Reform in 
Nova Scotia 1820-1867” in P. Girard & J. Phillips, eds., Essays in the History o f  Canadian Law : 
Volume III: Nova Scotia (Toronto: The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 1990) 114-115. 
An Act to authorize Her Majesty's subjects to p lead  and reason fo r  themselves or others in all Her 
Majesty's courts within this Province, S.N.S. 1850,13 Vic., c. 13, was Howe's valediction on the sedition 
trial. He was at the time provincial secretary in Nova Scotia’s first Reform cabinet.
112 Democratic government was not achieved until 1847-48.
“o f political enemies who, unable to contend effectively with the chief reform organ, 
sought to get rid o f its...editor by pursuing him mercilessly.”113 Thanks to the 
conviction of Wilkie, Howe was charged with seditious libel; thanks to the acquittal 
o f Howe, Nugent was not.
Conventional examinations of political controversy in the 1830s make it appear 
that there was no repressive use of the criminal law —  Howe was not arraigned for 
political crime. Historians interpreting these events must view the intended purpose 
o f the prosecution in light o f its altogether unexpected result. Current research 
suggests that Beck’s analysis o f Howe is fairly wide of the mark —  there was no 
criminal defamation. The only significant difference between Howe and Wilkie was 
the verdict and its consequences for the accused. Most importantly, there was the 
revelation that the political use of the criminal law could be contested legally. The 
tables really could be turned. The Howe sedition case resolved imbalances between 
the rule of law and the political use o f it, while highlighting controversial issues such 
as executive control o f the public prosecution process, jury selection and the political 
character o f the judiciary.
For the government, criminal justice administration was and had always been an 
important means of staking the outer limits o f acceptable political discourse. The 
Howe case reflects the degree of official apprehension o f political dissent achieving 
public consensus. Ergo, the aim was to quash the opposition, silence the means of 
communicating reform politics and depict press criticism of the status quo as 
unwarrantable and unpatriotic. It is evident from the different outcomes o f Wilkie 
and Howe that the repressive use of sedition law was not merely a question of élite 
predetermination or prosecutorial instrumentality. To argue otherwise is to 
underestimate the unusualness of peacetime political crime and the near-uniqueness 
o f public libel prosecutions, and to neglect the importance of legally contesting - 
successfully - legal repression. While executive control o f public prosecutions is 
undeniable, an in-depth sociolegal analysis is needed to understand politically 
repressive use o f the criminal law relative to its successful legal contestation. The 
Supreme Court may be seen as more or less a level playing field, though the rules 
o f the game were made by the ruling élite. Moreover, Attorney-General Archibald 
may to some extent be seen as an independent prosecutor, the perception o f whose 
independence was reinforced by his position as Speaker o f the House o f Assembly, 
and de facto  leader of the popular party in the legislature.
A number o f factors underlie this point. As in Upper Canada, the official élite 
made common cause with the merchantocracy, but this did not necessarily widen the 
possibilities o f repressive action against the petite bourgeoisie, for whom both 
Wilkie and Howe were spokesmen. Despite being exceptional and infrequent, 
sedition proceedings were not mentioned in dispatches to Whitehall, so the Colonial 
Office had no reason to suspect that legal repression was excessive or beyond the 
pale o f peace, order and good government. The absence o f grievances about 
oligarchic influence on the administration of criminal justice was a measure o f public 
confidence in the system, within which Wilkie unsuccessfully, and Howe 
successfully, contested the charge of sedition.
Criminal justice administration was influenceable, without being manipulable, 
because its claim to legitimacy derived from popular assent to the notion o f equality 
before and under the law, the ‘rule o f law’ being consensual. Political use of the 
criminal law was not the same as peacetime recourse to martial law against civilian 
offenders. An advantage o f the former was the potential to legitimate the actions of 
government by portraying the true prosecutors as the innocent victims o f unfair and 
untrue public criticism. Yet having recourse to repressive law undermined the 
legitimacy o f the official exercise o f prosecutorial authority by suggesting that its 
formal claims (disinterest, impartiality) subserved the government’s agenda. If  the 
exercise succeeds, as in Wilkie, it can be tried again; if it fails, as in Howe, it cannot
—  at least not until three generations have passed —  without risking the loss of 
public confidence in the essential fairness and restraint o f the criminal justice system. 
Resorting to a common-law offence as amorphous as sedition was a form of political 
brinkmanship. Political crime, then as now, lacks credibility. Howe was deeply 
scandalized by the nature o f the charge against him, which he ridiculed as the last 
refuge of scoundrels. Manipulating the criminal justice system in the direction of 
state or political crime was risky, precisely because of the ideological constraints of 
the rule of law concept. Law was not merely a political tool in the hands of 
government. Public confidence in the system, while tolerating repressive use o f the 
criminal law, also encouraged its victims to contest such uses. Howe’s faith in the 
impartiality o f “British justice” convinced him that the government’s using seditious 
libel prosecutions to stifle public criticism was a repressive use o f the criminal law 
which could be successfully contested.
Howe’s crash-course mastery of sedition law à la Thomas Erskine figured 
prominently in his defence to the charge. Unlike Wilkie, he argued not for truth as 
a defence to seditious libel but for a narrower definition o f it that excluded fair 
comment. Yet there was no criticism of the administration of justice —  as in 
Hooper, and also to some extent in Wilkie —  and no allegations that the magistrates
were guilty of misfeasance. This is what distinguishes Howe from both Wilkie and 
Hooper, where the crown’s case was stronger and the verdicts guilty. While the 
resort to sedition law bore the legitimacy of precedent, it was a double-edged sword, 
as Attorney-General Archibald realized. Despite the chief justice’s rather unsubtle 
attempt to direct a verdict o f conviction, the government could not depend on a trial 
jury to toe the line; and, because o f Archibald’s unwillingness to allow either of the 
law officers lead for the prosecution, Howe was able to exploit with spectacular 
success the very public forum o f a trial at bar in the Supreme Court. As Howe’s 
triumph demonstrates, the government’s prosecutorial monopoly and control o f the 
judiciary did not mean that a struggle such as Howe’s was a purely self-defensive 
reaction to an undefendable charge arising from the repressive use o f the criminal 
law. The fact that truth could not be pleaded as a defence to seditious libel did not 
mean that there was no defence.
The Howe case is a uniquely rich exemplification o f contested legality. An 
analysis o f Howe’s great speech in his own defence reveals not only the legal 
sophistication o f the accused, but also highlights the importance of law-finding in 
the verdicts o f libel juries. Howe’s arguments from fundamental freedoms and legal 
and equality rights thoroughly discredited the charge against him. They derived 
from his belief in the ju ry’s obligation to safeguard hard-won constitutional liberties, 
such as freedom of the press (only recently achieved in England), and to oppose by 
their verdict repressive use o f the criminal law by government. The very nature of 
sedition law and the deep interpenetration of government and the judiciary under the 
ancien régime placed in high relief concerns about crown prosecutorial 
responsibility, the independence of the grand jury, and the impartiality of the bench.
The fact that the Nova Scotia government controlled the inauguration of state- 
criminal proceedings was hardly a controversial departure from English practice, as 
it was in Upper Canada in the 1820s and New Brunswick in 1830-1. The 
attorney-general’s monopoly over crown prosecutions (which by no means 
precluded private prosecutions114) was benign —  except when the government 
ordered the prosecution o f a suspected political criminal. Despite the fact that the 
ex officio criminal information formed no part o f received English criminal 
procedure in Nova Scotia, Attorney-General Archibald could easily have proceeded 
by that mode - simply because the offence charged was sedition (a public libel) 
rather than defamation (a private libel).115 That he did not to do so, and explained
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why in his summation, is a most telling illustration o f the triumph of 
constitutionalism over legal repression.
The role of constitutionalism in contesting the use o f repressive legal instruments 
like the ex officio criminal information was a central theme in Hooper. However, 
resort to so extraordinary a prosecutorial weapon was unheard o f in New Brunswick 
until 1830 and unheard o f in Nova Scotia altogether. Hooper illustrates that this 
instrument offered the government distinct procedural advantages, such as the 
Damoclean sword o f delay o f trial —  Hooper’s was deferred for eight months. Even 
in seditious libel trials proceeding by way of regular indictment, the crown 
prosecutorial monopoly worked in the government’s favour, because either o f the 
law officers could exercise the prerogative right to address the jury last. By 1835, 
satisfaction with Attorney-General Archibald’s impartial and disinterested exercise 
o f prosecutorial discretion was so general that no one, least o f all the accused, 
noticed that he had exercised a right o f reply which was very inappropriate under the 
circumstances: neither he nor the solicitor-general nor a king’s counsel had led for 
the crown. In general, there was a high degree of public confidence in the 
nonpartisan exercise of public prosecutions, which not only precluded the use o f the 
ex officio criminal information against Wilkie or Howe, but also discouraged further 
sedition prosecutions after 1835.
On the other hand, the right o f an accused to counsel was also well established. 
According to Beamish Murdoch, writing a few years earlier, “in treasons and 
misdemeanours he [the accused] has the full benefit o f counsel to argue and address 
the jury for him.”116 Though defence counsel played no role in Wilkie, Hooper or 
Howe, this is not generally recognized as evidencing the state-trial nature o f the 
prosecution. Pro-lawyer sentiment was being articulated by Howe in the columns 
of the Novascotian at the same time as the legal profession was being excoriated in 
the pages o f John Hooper’s British Colonist.'11 Howe did not appear on his own 
behalf because he lacked confidence in counsel’s ability to do so. Towards the 
beginning of his defence Howe stated, “[ujnaccustomed as I am to the forms of 
courts and to the rules o f law, I would gladly have availed myself o f professional 
aid”118 — had he been able to obtain it. Small wonder that the experience o f being 
an accused seditionist unable to retain counsel generated in Howe an intense lifelong
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antipathy to lawyers.
The grand jury provided more ammunition for contestability than prosecutorial 
discretion or the threat o f jury-packing. The grand jury did not exclude magistrates 
and was therefore subject to manipulation both by the Court o f Sessions and by the 
presiding judge o f the Supreme Court, who exercised a highly controversial 
prerogative to appoint the foreman. Joseph Howe had far more to fear from the 
grand jury, which sent him for trial, than from the special juiy which tried and 
acquitted him. As far as the trial jury was concerned, neither the process of jury 
selection nor the freedom to give a verdict according to conscience was an issue. A 
special jury could be summoned to try an indictable misdemeanour, without 
endangering the accused’s right o f peremptory challenge, which Howe (unlike 
Wilkie) did not exercise.
The trial ju ry’s freedom to render a general verdict was based on the recognition 
that Fox’s Libel Act was o f full force and effect in Nova Scotia and that it applied to 
all forms o f libel, public (seditious, obscene, blasphemous) as well as private 
(defamatory). Trial by jury and verdict according to conscience —  central to 
civil-libertarian opposition to the development of sedition law in eighteenth-century 
England, and virtually suspended in Upper Canada under the Seditious Aliens Act 
(1804-1829) —  were taken for granted in Nova Scotia. As is clear from Howe, 
Erskine’s famous arguments on the trial jury’s right to deliver a general verdict were 
recapitulated, and Nova Scotia’s instantaneous reception o f the common-law 
declaratory Libel Act was reconfirmed. Upper Canada, where the need was greater 
because of a punitive sedition statute, did not have the benefit o f Fox’s Libel Act. 
Ultimately, it fell to the jury in Howe to become the voice of popular protest against 
oppressive prosecutions and Sessional misgovemment, as that role had been 
abdicated by the new neo-conservative grand jury. Though the accused in his 
defence suggested no such thing, the trial jury by their verdict sent a clear message 
to the Council and the magistrates that the local government was inefficient and 
corrupt and required reform or replacement.
Sedition proceedings raised constitutional issues that went beyond the 
government’s repressive use o f the criminal law to the active involvement of the 
Tory-Loyalist judiciary in the legislative process. The celebrated prosecutions o f the 
Dean o f St Asaph (1783-4), Stockdale (1789), Perry (1793), Rowan (1793-4), 
Reeves (1796), Peltier (1803) and Hone (1817) figured prominently in Howe’s
defence.119 More importantly, Nova Scotia, which never had sedition legislation, had 
always had the benefit o f Fox’s Libel Act, which was not in force in Upper Canada. 
Yet the common law also proved to be a double-edged sword, while the long 
struggle for, and ultimate achievement o f responsible government virtually 
prevented the recurrence of sedition prosecutions. Along the way, the wholesale 
reform of town government, in the shape of Halifax’s long-deferred incorporation 
as a city in 1841, was also achieved. A failed prosecution for sedition against a 
progressive, reformist newspaper editor became the spur to a mass movement of 
political protest and to political reform, however gradual. It not only discouraged 
further legal repression, but also perhaps forestalled the descent into rebellion which 
engulfed the Canadas two years after Howe. What would have happened in Nova 
Scotia had Howe been convicted?
As an episode in Canadian law and Canadian history, Howe clearly demonstrates 
the very broad applications of a judicially-legislated offence like seditious libel. As 
J.M. Bumsted has written in another context, “Seditious libel was the classic 
Anglo-Canadian charge used by those seeking to muzzle public criticism.”120 
Seditious libel had more of sedition than o f libel about it. The long-term 
politico-legal effect o f Howe was to extinguish sedition as a crime in Nova Scotia; 
there would not be another prosecution for nearly ninety years. Before Howe, 
seditious libel prosecutions were an assured conviction; after Howe, they were 
deemed risky, counter-productive and not worth pursuing.
Sociolegal history is essential to understanding the interrelationship o f law and 
politics and government’s use o f the former to regulate and control the latter. 
Certainly the Nova Scotian sedition cases - Hoffman (1753), Wilkie (1820), Howe 
(1835) and McLachlan (1923) - document the overwhelming importance of political 
crime both to the colonial state and to the experience of “conservative” reformers 
such as Joseph Howe, not to mention radical ones such as William Wilkie and J.B. 
McLachlan. Sedition law was an extreme and usually effective means of censoring 
extra-legislative political discourse. Prosecutions were designed to intimidate 
influential public opinion-makers and neutralize potential leaders of a popular 
opposition, by stigmatizing pro bono publico criticism as untrue and unfair and 
imputing a spirit o f disloyalty to it. Yet while serving to justify and excuse its 
repressive use by government, the law was multi-purpose. Victims of the
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prosecution could use the machinery of the criminal law to contest legal repression 
by government. Sedition as an instance and instrument of the repressive use of 
criminal law reveals tensions between rule o f law and rule o f government, state and 
people, authority and discretion — articulated in concerns about government control 
o f public prosecutions, the grand jury and the judiciary. Howe’s great hopes and 
expectations for British justice had everything to do with constitutionalism and 
nothing with legalism. Howe’s optimistic sentiments bespoke his fundamental belief 
in the system, his belief that the rule o f law was the guarantee o f the liberty o f the 
subject and o f equality before and under the law. The source o f Howe’s immense 
popular appeal as a victim who refused to lie down was not that the government had 
deprived him o f his constitutional rights, but that they had falsely and maliciously 
accused him of, and prosecuted him for a crime which he had not committed. He 
used the law decisively to remedy its misuse by government, a strategy which 
highlighted the political inexpediency o f legal repression. What had worked before 
would not work again because it was wrong.
The positive effect o f Howe’s success, however, should not be exaggerated. The 
fact that public prosecutions were always initiated by government meant that trials 
in the Supreme Court were risky self-defensive exercises, which, while not 
precluding the possibility o f unanticipated acquittals, made their occurrence 
improbable. And it is evident that claims of contestability, which defied precedent 
and the collective wisdom o f the legal profession, were weak on their face —  given 
government control o f the prosecution process in state trials. Nevertheless, the effect 
o f Howe’s acquittal was to checkmate legal repression by holding the magistrates 
accountable, and embarrassing the government in such a manner as to kick-start 
reform in the legislative sphere. The reform leadership-in-waiting—  in other words, 
the lawyers who would not defend Howe in that most public o f all public forums, the 
Supreme Court —  declined to do so in part because they realized that the more 
important struggles ultimately had to take place in the political arena, in the House 
o f Assembly, and not in extra-parliamentary forums such as the grand jury and the 
liberal press. Repressive prosecutions, the political use of the criminal law and 
ancillary crimes against the state could only be effectively resisted if “high-profile” 
acquittals were procured. Legal successes, especially surprising ones, caused 
massive loss o f face and credibility on the part o f government, and unquestionably 
discouraged resort to sedition law after 1835. However, constitutional reform could 
only be secured by political action in the legislature. From 1836, when the final 
battle was joined, until 1848, when final victory was won, the legislature - not the 
courts - would be the arena o f political struggle in Nova Scotia.
Nevertheless, legal contests such as Wilkie and Howe bulk large in the
pre-confederation experience. The defeat o f reform in 1819-20 played an important 
role not only in the government’s further recourse to sedition law but also in Howe’s 
strategy of resistance. The law, having changed significantly in 1792, had not 
changed in the interval since Wilkie’s conviction; but, in the political sphere, the 
ancien régime had fallen and public opinion in Halifax had become more 
enlightened as the abuses complained of by Wilkie grew progressively worse and the 
magistrates more petty-tyrannical and irresponsible. The importance of these legal 
struggles should not be overlooked by sociolegal historians. Barry W right’s 
contested legality model is instructive for understanding the exercise of hegemonic 
authority over movements of political protest and petit-bourgeois radicalism, through 
repressive use o f the criminal law. Sedition as a range of indictable offences is still 
with us, though there have been no prosecutions since Boucher (for seditious libel) 
in 1949, and despite the recommendation of the Law Reform Commission o f Canada 
in 1986 that sedition should be abolished.121 While the definition of seditious 
intention has grown so narrow as almost to render prosecutions nugatory, the scope 
o f the offence is potentially as wide as ever. Moreover, while the means of 
contesting the legality o f crimes against the state have been greatly expanded by the 
legal and equality rights entrenched in the Canadian Charter o f  Rights and 
Freedoms, criminal procedure remains essentially unaltered. Revisiting historical 
experience o f legal repression, and nuancing the more conventional and superficial 
interpretations o f it, remind us that those “fundamental freedoms” now guaranteed 
by the Charter once were threatened and became established at a cost. As for Howe, 
it seems not a coincidence that the first o f the two scholarly biographies o f him (by 
James Roy) was published during the centenary o f his sedition trial. Howe was 
decisive not just for the history of Canadian state trials, but for the history o f political 
protest in Canada, in which it was a turning-point. The trial o f Joseph Howe meant 
that Nova Scotia’s constitutional reconstruction would be achieved not by rebellion, 
as in the Canadas, but by a ‘quiet revolution.’
Appendix: The Alleged Seditious Libel
“There is no truth at all i’ the oracle:
The Sessions shall proceed —  this is mere falsehood.” — SHAKESPEARE.122
121 Law Reform Commission o f  Canada, Criminal Law: crimes against the state: Working Paper 49 
(Ottawa: The Commission, 1986) at 64.
122 The Winter’s Tale (3.Ü.141); the speaker is Leontes, King o f Sicily, whose wife Hermione has just 
been exculpated from an indictment for high treason, for adultery and encompassing the death o f the 
king.
Mr. Howe,
Sir, — Living, as we do in a free and intelligent Country, and under the 
influence o f a Constitution which attaches to our rulers the salutary restrictions of 
responsibility in all matters o f government, is it not surprising that the inhabitants o f 
Halifax should have so long submitted to those shameful and barefaced impositions 
and exactions, which have from year to year been levied on them, in the shape of 
Town and County Taxes. Repeated attempts have from time to time been made, by 
independent minded persons among us, to excite amongst their countrymen some 
spirit o f resistance or opposition to those unwarrantable and unequal exactions, 
which have been drained from the pocket o f the public. But it seems to me, that the 
torpid indifference to public matters which has hitherto been the general 
characteristic o f the people, has at length become quickened and aroused by a calm 
and deliberate reflection on what must be their future condition if they any longer 
neglect to look after the servants of the State. In a young and poor country where the 
sons o f rich and favoured families alone, receive education at the public expence — 
where the many must toil to support the extortions and exactions o f the few; where 
the hard earnings o f the people are lavished on an Aristocracy, who repay their ill 
timed generosity with contempt and insult; it requires no ordinary nerve in men of 
moderate circumstances and humble pretensions, to stand forward and boldly protest 
against measures which are fast working the ruin of the Province. Does there, Mr. 
Editor, exist in any free state save Nova Scotia, a responsible Magistracy, who would 
for 30 years brave and brook the repeated censures of the Press, without even 
attempting a justification o f their conduct, or giving to the public some explanation 
that might refute those unjust and licentious libels, which have repeatedly been a 
disgrace to them or to the press o f the country. Are the journals o f our land 
exclusive; do they admit only the wild and reckless portion of the people, and shut 
their columns against the sober and discreet supporters o f the men in power? I 
cannot think this, Mr. Howe; and yet weeks have elapsed since charges too grave to 
be slighted and too plain to be misunderstood, have been placed, through the 
medium of the press, before the eye of the public, and yet no champion of the sacred 
band has taken the field to deny or to explain. I candidly and willingly admit that 
there are in the ranks o f the Magistracy, individuals justly entitled to the esteem and 
respect o f their fellow townsmen, but they have mostly left the Arena, disgusted with 
the scenes that were enacted by their more active and energetic brethren. I will 
venture to affirm, without the possibility o f being contradicted by proof, that during 
the lapse of the last 30 years, the Magistracy and Police have, by one stratagem or 
other, taken from the pockets of the people, in over exactions, fines, &c. a sum that 
would exceed in the gross amount £30,000; and I am prepared to prove my 
assertions whenever they are manly enough to come forward and justify their
conduct to the people. —  Can it not be proved, and is it not notorious, that one o f the 
present active Magistrates has contrived for years, to filch from one establishment, 
and that dedicated to the comfort o f the poor and destitute, at least £300 per annum? 
Can it not be proved, that the fines exacted in the name and on the behalf o f our 
Sovereign Lord the King, have annually for the last 30 years exceeded £200; and of 
this sum His most Gracious Majesty has received about as much as would go into 
the Royal coffers, if  the long dormant claim o f the Quit Rents was revived 
imprudently. Is it not known to every reflecting and observant man, whose business 
or curiosity has led him to take a view o f the municipal bustle o f our Court o f 
Sessions, that from the pockets of the poor and distressed at least £1000 is drawn 
annually, and pocketed by men whose services the Country might well spare. Those 
things, Mr. Howe, cannot much longer be endured, even by the loyal and peaceable 
inhabitants o f Nova-Scotia. One half o f the most respectable o f the middling orders 
have this year [1834] been sued or summoned for the amount of their last years’ 
Poor and County Rates; and nearly the whole town have appealed or are murmuring 
at the extravagant amount o f the assessment for the present year. I will venture to 
affirm, and have already affirmed in a former number,123 that £1500 ought to defray 
all ordinary expences for the County; and by the speech of His Excellency at the 
opening o f the Session, we are informed that the people of England have, with their 
wonted generosity, relieved us o f a large portion o f the extraordinary expenses 
which the visitation of Providence rendered necessary. In fine, Mr. Howe, the affairs 
o f the County have been for years conducted in a slovenly, extravagant and 
unpopular manner, and the people have been entirely in the dark, as regards the 
collection and appropriation o f their monies; but they have now amongst them a 
Chief Magistrate,124 who has pledged himself to be candid, and I trust we will find 
him impartial also. I am neither a flatterer, nor physiognomist, but I cannot help 
observing in the martial tread and manly mien o f our present Governor, some of the 
outward features o f the late Sir John Sherbrooke,125 and if  the inward man be 
corresponding, there is yet some hope for THE PEOPLE.”
Source: The Novascotian, or Colonial Herald (Halifax NS), 1 January 1835
123 Novascotian, 19 Nov 1834.
124 Major-General Sir Colin Campbell took office as lieutenant-governor o f  Nova Scotia in July 1834.
125 Lieutenant-General Sir John Coape Sherbrooke, who died in 1830, was lieutenant-governor o f  Nova 
Scotia, 1811-1816; afterwards governor-general o f  Canada.
